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THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION SURVEY
OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
RAYMOND I. PARNAS*
Almost everyone today is aware that acts of physical violence in the
home between spouses and other adult intimates are a statistically com-
mon occurrence. It is well known that the cycle of repetition, injury
escalation, and ultimate homicide occurs worldwide. Books on the sub-
ject abound.1 Newspapers and magazines periodically run features on
the subject. Documentaries and movies, such as the highly publicized
prime-time movie "The Burning Bed," and more recently, "Cry for
Help," are shown on television.
National, state, and local organizations, both private and public, have
been created to focus attention on the issue. In 1984, Congress passed
the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act.' Every state now has
some kind of legislation, civil, criminal, or both, specifically directed at
coping with this problem. These statutes establish, among other things,
crisis shelters, protective orders, specialized police training, altered arrest
requirements, charging guidelines, and treatment programs. Litigation
to mandate remedial action is abundant, and research is continuous. Po-
* With invaluable assistance by Scott Taryle, Melissa Hill, and Allison Hughes, University of
California at Davis School of Law.
This Article was originally prepared for inclusion in a forthcoming book of essays on the overall
impact of the American Bar Foundation Survey of Criminal Justice, to be edited by Lloyd E. Ohlin.
I owe much of my professional career to retiring Professor Frank Miller to whom this issue is
dedicated. When I was a student at Washington University School of Law from 1961 to 1964, he
made the study of Criminal Law interesting with his challenging hypotheticals, always beginning
with "Suppose Mr. Parnas ....... His Criminal Justice Administration Seminar's focus on
prosecutorial discretion began my life long interest in the charging decision. When I began to think
about leaving private practice for teaching in 1966, he encouraged me and helped me to go to his
alma mater, Wisconsin, for graduate work. I have been honored to be a co-author on casebooks with
him since 1972. He is a friend for whom I have great respect, and to whom I wish much continued
health and happiness.
1. For a very recent and excellent summary of many issues, see FAMILY VIOLENCE (L. Ohlin
and M. Tonry, eds. 1989).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10413 (1988).
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lice, prosecutors, judges, and other relevant entities hold meetings and
promulgate policy statements on the issue.
I. THE PAST
It was not always so. Until 1967 not a single book or journal article
focused on the law's response to intrafamily violence.3 There was practi-
cally no legislation on the subject, nor focused organizations, reported
litigation, or published research. Immediately prior to 1967, knowledge
of the extent and complexity of the problem existed almost totally within
the confines of the families affected, the responsible agencies, and those
familiar with the empirical data derived from the ABF Survey of the
Administration of Criminal Justice4 conducted in Michigan, Wisconsin,
and Kansas in 1956 and 1957.
ABF Survey researchers repeatedly chronicled domestic disputes as
they described the daily activities of the criminal justice agencies they
observed. Accordingly, several writers, having early access to the ABF
data, published works implicitly or expressly including the issue of do-
mestic violence within their focus. For example, Professor Joseph Gold-
stein in his classic article, "Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal
Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice,"5
stated that the American Bar Foundation provided him with access to
confidential daily reports of a large municipal police force.6 Drawing on
those reports, Goldstein devoted several pages to a description of routine
non-enforcement practices in admittedly very common felonious assault
cases. The major reason cited for non-arrest was the victim's refusal to
prosecute. Other reasons mentioned included the extensive paper work
required for so many arrests, limited resources to investigate other
crimes, cross-cultural bias by white police regarding inter-"Negro" as-
saults, and the prediction of dismissal by the court or prosecutor due to
3. But see R. ADAMS, WIFE BEATING AS A CRIME AND ITS RELATION TO TAXATION (1886),
cited in Pleck, CriminalApproaches to Family Violence, 1640-1980 in FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note
1, at 19.
4. The American Bar Foundation published the results of its survey in a five-volume series: R.
DAWSON, SENTENCING (1969); W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY (1965); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME (1969); L. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL (1969); L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, AND D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OV CRIME:
STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT
(1966).
5. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
6. Id. at 554.
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an uncooperative victim.7
Goldstein's work was clearly very important in illuminating the com-
mon occurrence of assaults, describing the police response, discussing the
reasons for this practice, and questioning its appropriateness. It is fasci-
nating, however, that he never addressed the context in which these as-
saults occurred. In other words, he never mentioned the intimate,
spousal, family, or domestic nature of many of the assaults he reviewed.
Is that complicating factor irrelevant to the victim's lack of cooperation
in prosecution? Is it irrelevant to the routine response of non-arrest,
prosecution, or conviction? Is it irrelevant to fashioning an appropriate
governmental response to a clear violation of the penal code? Despite
these possible analytical omissions, long before arrest became fashionable
in domestic violence cases (as it is today), Goldstein in that seminal arti-
cle urged arrest as a more appropriate response to felonious assault. But
is that because he, like today's domestic violence-arrest advocates, failed
to comprehend adequately the complexity and implications of the "fam-
ily" context of so many of these assaults? But I am getting ahead of
myself. For now, let's see what followed Goldstein's very influential
1960 piece.
In 1965 the ABF published the first volume analyzing its field data. In
Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody,8 Wayne LaFave
used a variety of domestic violence incidents from the field studies as
illustrations for many of the factors he thought played a role in police
decisionmaking. Thus, not only did the visibility level of common as-
saults increase, as begun by Goldstein, but now, for the first time, the
domestic nature of much of the violence became public. Additionally,
the use of specific illustrations drawn directly from the field studies high-
lighted the complexity of a variety of family violence situations. For ex-
ample, LaFave dramatically illustrated Goldstein's cross-cultural bias
non-arrest factor by using a "Negro" spousal stabbing incident in a sec-
tion entitled "Conduct Thought to Reflect the Standards of a Commu-
nity Subgroup."9
Taking Goldstein's work still further, LaFave established three catego-
ries of cases in which the "victim does not or will not request prosecu-
tion." Two of these categories involved close contact between the
participants as a discrete discriminating factor: 1) "Victim in continuing
7. Id. at 573-580.
8. W. LAFAVE, supra note 4.
9. Id. at 110-114.
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relationship with offender," and 2) "Victim a member of offender's fam-
ily.' ° He acknowledged "[the reluctance of the victim to prosecute
makes conviction difficult or impossible and is at least some indication
that the offense is not serious enough to justify the expenditure of time
and effort of the police and prosecutor.""
But LaFave also found exceptions to the non-arrest rule. For example,
arrests would occur when police had knowledge of repeated offenses,
when a brief lecture did not close the incident, or when the offender
threatened subsequent harm (even though the victim did not wish to
prosecute). 2 LaFave used domestic violence incidents to illustrate his
following pro-arrest categories:
1. Tactics employed when arrest is desired [but not authorized] for a mis-
demeanor not in the presence:13
a. Encouraging another offense and thus creating a basis for a lawful
arrest.
b. Persuading the suspect to remain voluntarily in custody while war-
rant is obtained.
2. Arrest to avoid a strain upon available resources [known repeated
calls in the past]. 14
Like Goldstein, LaFave in 1965 considered full arrest, but did so ex-
plicitly in the domestic dispute context and with ABF examples. One
Michigan police chief, disturbed by the number of domestic calls re-
ceived, issued a directive requiring an arrest in all domestic disputes, pre-
sumably believing that this would end the calls for service. However, no
evaluation of this policy change was possible because the City Attorney
reversed it after only one week's duration. LaFave's comment about that
policy is interesting in light of the current full enforcement craze. It con-
trasts with Goldstein's earlier, more positive view of full arrest, possibly
again because of LaFave's better appreciation of the complexity of these
incidents. He said:
More likely the effect would be to reduce the number of complaints when it
became known that the spouse would be put in jail as a consequence of any
complaint made. Such a consequence would not necessarily be desirable,
particularly if no other agency were ready to assume the task of mediating
10. Id. at 119-123.
11. Id. at 114.
12. Id. at 144-152.
13. Id. at 28-30.
14. Id. at 144.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss1/7
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family disputes which had been handled by the police.15
The Misdemeanor Complaint Bureau (MCB), a very imaginative
quasi-judicial response to domestic violence fashioned by the Detroit po-
lice and prosecutor, was also discovered in the ABF data and reported
for the first time by LaFave.16 In 1969, Frank Miller's ABF Survey
book, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime, gave
the MCB greater prominence in his chapter, "The Decision Not to
Charge Because Informal Administrative Procedures More Satisfactorily
Achieve Objectives Underlying Criminal Statutes." Section B of that
chapter dealt with "Family and Neighborhood Assaults: The Misde-
meanor Complaint Bureau." Miller reported that despite the vast
number of family assault complaints and victim's initial insistence on
prosecution, prosecutors dissuaded prosecution, and therefore, few oc-
curred. Resource and priority considerations were only partly the cause
of this practice. Prosecutors generally discouraged victims from pressing
charges against their attackers because they found that most victims
changed their minds before trial, making successful prosecution impossi-
ble or difficult. 7 Another complicating factor for successful prosecu-
tions was said to be the frequent shared "guilt" of the parties."8
Additionally, it was felt that charging would "place an additional strain
on an inevitably continuing relationship." 19 Prosecutors therefore pre-
ferred amicable solutions to these problems, an alternative to field adjust-
ment or prosecution.2 °  It was apparently in this contextual
understanding of domestic violence that the MCB was born. An assis-
tant prosecutor screened complaints for dismissal, charge, or referral to
the MCB. Most domestic assaults were referred. A hearing date was set
about one week after the complaint and notices were delivered. If no one
appeared, reconciliation was assumed, and the case dropped. Second no-
tices were sent if the victim appeared without the defendant and wanted
to proceed. A subsequent failure to appear by the defendant resulted in a
charge and a warrant. The hearing, held in a room in the prosecuting
attorney's office, was conducted by a detective, often referred to as
"Judge."2 Mediation and/or referral was the goal, and four general dis-
15. Id. at 145-146.
16. Id. at 123, 144-146.
17. F. MILLER, supra note 4, at 266-267.
18. Id. at 267.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 268.
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positions were available to promote this goal: 1) dismissal because of
minor or equal guilt, or due to victim's decision to cease further prosecu-
tion efforts; 2) recommendation of formal judicial process by warrant (in
cases of severe physical injury); 3) adjournment without date; and 4)
"peace bond."22
Adjournment without date implied official action if further difficulties
arose, but in fact a new offense was necessary. The "peace bond" was the
most frequent disposition, though it had no foundation in Michigan law
and indeed no bond was actually posted. Nonetheless, an informal rec-
ord was kept and imposition was sometimes taken into account (if
known) in subsequent charging or MCB decisions. 23 What can be said of
a creative, arguably successful, but legally unfounded, sham perpetrated
on the public by our legal system? Miller, discussing similar use of a
"peace bond" by Chicago courts, concluded:
When the active endorsement of the system by police, prosecutors, and pri-
vate defense attorneys is combined with the complainant's and defendant's
unawareness of the lack of any official standing of the peace bond, it is not
surprising that the procedure is effective both to satisfy the complainant
that there has been "official" action taken with respect to the complaints,
and to deter the defendant from future infractions. The detectives in the
domestic relations detail estimate that 85 per cent of the cases in which the
defendant is placed on a peace bond achieve the desired result. Indeed,
frequently complainants go to the prosecutor's office requesting the imposi-
tion of the peace bond.24
In between the publication of the two aforementioned ABF books, the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice issued its report, the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,2 5 and
supporting Task Force reports. Many of those who had worked on the
ABF Survey and books were also on the Commission staff. The ABF
data itself was used in the Commission Reports. 26 The Challenge of
Crime focused greater attention than ever before on many of LaFave's
earlier observations about domestic violence. But it went further by
22. Id. at 269.
23. Id. at 269-270.
24. Id. at 270-271 (footnotes omitted).
25. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME].
26. Id. at 276, 291; TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 50-51 (1967) [hereinafter THE
POLICE].
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specifying issues in need of further research and recommending policy
guidelines for the exercise of police discretion. For example:
A common kind of situation that illustrates the complexity, delicacy-and
frustration-of much police work is the matrimonial dispute, which police
experts estimate consumes as much time as any other single kind of situa-
tion. These family altercations often occur late at night, when the only
agency available to people in trouble is the police. Because they occur late
at night, they can disturb the peace of a whole neighborhood. And, of
course, they can lead to crime; in fact, they are probably the single greatest
cause of homicides. Yet the capacity of the police to deal effectively with
such a highly personal matter as conjugal disharmony is, to say the least,
limited. Arresting one party or both is unlikely to result in either a prose-
cution or a reconciliation. Removing one of the parties from the scene, an
expedient the police often resort to, sometimes by using force, may create
temporary peace, but it scarcely solves the problem. An order to see a fam-
ily counselor in the morning is unenforceable and more likely to be ignored
than obeyed. And mediating the difficulty of enraged husbands and wives
ad hoc is an activity for which few policemen-or people in any other pro-
fession-are qualified by temperament or by training. Again no statistics
are available, but there is a strong impression in police circles that interven-
tion in these disputes causes more assaults on policemen than any other
kind of encounter.
Handling minor disputes is an activity that is regarded as of small impor-
tance by most police administrators. Yet it occupies a great deal of the time
of many policemen. To the disputants themselves, who are more often than
not law-abiding citizens, the manner in which the police intervene in their
affairs is a matter of great importance. Disputes, particularly domestic dis-
putes, as discussed earlier, are a subject about which it would be difficult to
formulate policy without first engaging in considerable research. The police
should seek to accumulate information about families that cause repeated
disturbances, to discover whether certain kinds of disturbances are more
likely than others to lead to serious assaults or to homicides, to compile
statistics on the typical effects of having one of the parties swear out a com-
plaint against the other, to become familiar with the social-service agencies,
if any, to which troubled families can be referred. For the police to medi-
ate, arbitrate or suppress each dispute that they encounter as if it were
unique--or as if all disputes were alike--contributes little, in the long run,
either to law enforcement or to community service.27
27. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 25, at 92, 104.
1991]
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The Commission recommends:
Police departments should develop and enunciate policies that give police
personnel specific guidance for the common situations requiring exercise of
police discretion. Policies should cover such matters, among others, as...
the handling of minor disputes .... and the decision whether or not to
arrest in specific situations involving specific crimes. 28
The Commission's Task Force Report: The Police more explicitly and
directly questioned both the necessity and efficacy of both non-arrest and
non-prosecution practices even if the victim was uncooperative.2 9
Though also concerned about ghetto-police relations in regard to a
broader variety of aggravated assaults, the report specifically includes
domestics in its comments:
The police handling of aggravated assaults raises issues of a different char-
acter. These offenses come to police attention more routinely because they
frequently occur in public; the victim or witnesses seek out the police; there
is a desire for police intervention before more harm is done; or simply be-
cause the victim desires police assistance in acquiring medical aid. But
while the perpetrator is known to the victim in a high percentage of the
cases, there frequently is no arrest or, if an arrest is made, it is followed by
release by the police without prosecution. This is especially true in the
ghetto areas of large urban centers, due, according to police, primarily to an
unwillingness on the part of the victim to cooperate.
The failure to make an arrest for a serious assault is especially common if
the parties involved are related or close friends. Police, based upon their
experience, feel that there will be an unwillingness on the part of the victim
to assist .... Even if the victim cooperates at the investigation stage, the
police assume from their experience that the willingness to cooperate will
disappear at the time of trial when the victim will refuse to testify and may
even express a desire that the assaultive husband or acquaintance be set
free.
It would be possible for police to achieve some success in assault cases by
resort to the subpoena in order to compel the victim to testify. But this
procedure is seldom used. Given the high volume of cases and the compet-
ing demands upon a police agency, the path of least resistance is to acqui-
esce to the desires of the victim. The position is often rationalized on the
grounds that the injured party was the only person harmed and that the
community as a whole was not affected by the crime. These cases can be
written off statistically as clearances, which is viewed as an index of police
efficiency, and thus the most immediate administrative pressure is satisfied
28. Id. at 104.
29. THE POLICE, supra note 26, at 21-24.
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.... Were the police to review their current practices, they might well
conclude, for example, that so far as assaults are concerned, it is desirable
to base police decisions to arrest on such criteria as the nature of the as-
sault, the seriousness of the injury, and the prior record of the assailant. 30
But one year later, in 1968, the Report of the National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders (Disorders Commission Report)31 seemed again
to emphasize non-arrest by focusing on the service, non-adversary func-
tions of the police in a domestic violence context:
The Commission believes that police cannot, and should not, resist becom-
ing involved in community service matters. There will be benefits for law
enforcement no less than for public order.
First, police, because of their 'front line position' in dealing with ghetto
problems, will be better able to identify problems in the community that
may lead to disorder. Second, they will be better able to handle incidents
requiring police intervention, particularly marital disputes that have a po-
tential for violence. How well the police handle domestic disturbances af-
fects the incidence of serious crimes, including assaults and homicides.
Third, willing performance of such work can gain police the respect and
support of the community. Finally, development of nonadversary contacts
can provide the police with a vital source of information and intelligence
concerning the communities they serve.
32
The above publications, all written in the 1960s, drew upon the ABF
data and asked questions about the adequacy of societal responses. For
the first time, the problem of domestic violence began to arouse public
attention. But these early public references, as important as they were,
still left our initial knowledge of intrafamily assaults in the shadows.
They treated the topic briefly and then only in the context of other pri-
mary concerns-police discretion, arrest, crime, charging, and civil
disorders.
Toward the end of the 1960s, two researchers independently focused
their energies on domestic violence alone. Dr. Morton Bard, from the
Psychological Center of CUNY, along with Dr. Sydney Berkowitz, be-
gan training police in family crisis intervention. Their program subse-
quently influenced police training programs throughout the United
States. About the same time, in 1967, I began to publish a series of law
journal articles describing the problem of intrafamily violence and the
30. Id. at 22.
31. Also known as the "Kerner Commission Report" [hereinafter Disorders Commission
Report].
32. Id. at 167.
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variety of existing public and private responses to that phenomenon.33
Just as the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders empha-
sized the police "service" function respecting marital disputes,34 Bard
and Berkowitz's Family Crisis Intervention Unit (FCIU) project empha-
sized crime prevention by training police to intervene not only as law
enforcers but as subprofessional mental health specialists, primarily using
mediation and referral techniques. The Bard-Berkowitz approach in-
cluded family crisis specialist selection, intensive mental health pretrain-
ing, and in-service training, which resulted in special patrol units
responding to all family crises.35 Indeed, the Disorders Commission Re-
port expressly cited the FCIU project as a program of special interest to
improve police performance of the "service" function.36 Whether due to
political reasons, resource limitations, or uncertain evaluative data, how-
ever, the Bard-Berkowitz comprehensive approach was not wholly con-
tinued in New York or elsewhere beyond the early seventies. But cities
like Oakland, California and Louisville, Kentucky attempted to replicate
many aspects of New York's FCIU; departments everywhere, learning
from the publicity it received, added or increased training in family crisis
intervention techniques. Thus, the Bard and Berkowitz work, at a mini-
mum, increased awareness of the problem, suggested its complexity, and
greatly stimulated police training.
According to Bard, the FCIU experiment did not have its origin in the
ABF data. Rather, it was born out of Bard and Berkowitz's prior per-
sonal job experience as policemen. 7 In contrast, the catalyst for my
work on this subject was Professor Frank Remington, Director of the
ABF Survey Project Staff and Editor of the ABF Survey books. I drew
33. These works include: Parnas, Judicial Response to Intra-Family Violence, 54 MINN. L.
REv. 585 (1970) [hereinafter Judicial Response]; Parnas, Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents
ofIntra-Family Violence, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 539 (1971) [hereinafter Police Discretion];
Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 914 (1967) [hereinafter
Police Response]; Parnas, Prosecutorial and Judicial Handling of Family Violence Matters, 9 CRIM.
L. BULL. 733 (1973); Parnas, The Relevance of Criminal Law to Interspousal Violence, in FAMILY
VIOLENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY (J. Eekelaar & S. Katz eds. 1978)
[hereinafter, The Relevance of Criminal Law]; Parnas, The Response of Some Relevant Community
Resources to Intra.Family Violence, 44 IND. L.J. 159 (1969) [hereinafter Response of Some Relevant
Community Resources].
34. Disorders Commission Report, supra note 31, at 167.
35. See eg., Bard & Berkowitz, "Training Police as Specialists in Family Crisis Intervention:
A Community Psychology Action Program," 3 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 315, 317 (1967).
36. Disorders Commission Report, supra note 31, at 167.
37. Conversation with Bard, Summer 1989.
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the initial data directly from ABF data printouts, the ABF Survey books,
and the few other ABF influenced works discussed above. Like Bard, I
focused solely on domestic violence, but my scope was much broader-
indeed, the entire universe of available intrafamily dispute information.
In five law journal articles published from 1967 to 1973,38 I described
intrafamily violence in the context of police, prosecutor, judicial, and
other community responses to it. In addition to the ABF material gath-
ered in 1956 and 1957, the articles analyzed lengthy personal observa-
tions of the Chicago response network of ten years later, together with
empirical data acquired in other key areas around the country in the late
1960s and early 1970s. These articles were the first to focus on this phe-
nomenon, treat it in depth, and describe the complete societal response to
it in detail. Equally important, the articles illustrated incidents, catego-
rized practices, and offered explanations for the various responses. In
addition, they attempted to quantify the extent of the problem whenever
data was available and suggested recommendations for future action.
As to the police, for example, I reiterated the Challenge of Crimes'
important call for a clearly stated departmental policy related to recruit-
ment and training of officers as well as field practices.3 9 I also raised
related practical issues concerning the use of specialized units, beat as-
signment, dispatcher guidelines, repeat offender information in the field,
referral mechanisms, follow-up, recordkeeping, and the relevance of sub-
culture criteria. Respecting the prosecutor's office, I recommended that
charging decisions be made only by lawyers, that social service adjuncts
be used when mediation and referral was needed, and that the use of
prosecutors be completely replaced in most domestic assaults by civil
family court jurisdiction.' Commenting on the criminal judicial re-
sponse, I recommended the elimination of sham procedures like the
MCB's detective "judges" and non-existent "peace bonds."'" "The
traditional [criminal] judicial process is neither an effective solution nor a
deterrent, and in fact can aggravate an inflamed situation by imposition
of a fine against already depleted finances, or a jail sentence which
removes whatever earning capacity or family stability which exists."'42
38. See supra note 33.
39. Police Response, supra note 33, at 957; Police Discretion, supra note 33, at 560-565.
40. Judicial Response, supra note 33, at 641-644.
41. Police Discretion, supra note 33, at 562; Judicial Response, supra note 33, at 600-605, 642-
643.
42. Judicial Response, supra note 33, at 642.
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Once again I called for increased resources for mental health and social
service court adjuncts.4 3 A myriad of innovative responses needed to be
explored, .including: arbitration, mediation, and conciliation through
peer, neighborhood, or ecclesiastical entities, school classes on family liv-
ing, and better community services outreach programs.'
As many of these recommendations suggest, underlying all of these
early articles were two overriding themes: (1) prevention of the initial
incident or of repetition and escalation of prior incidents; and (2) service
and support to the disputants and adjustment of the problem, rather than
arrest, prosecution, and conviction in those cases involving nonserious
injury. This second goal was dramatically altered in 1977,45 prior to the
full enforcement movement. Clearly those early articles removed any re-
maining semblance of low visibility from the problem of domestic vio-
lence as well as highlighted the complexity of this phenomenon and the
difficulties in fashioning adequate and appropriate responses to it.
The first other journal article dealing solely with family violence was
not published until 1971." At least seven more specifically focused law
journal articles were written by others and published in the seventies. 47
But beginning in 1974 books on the subject began to flow even more
quickly, starting with Scream Quietly or the Neighbors Will Hear, first
published in England by Erin Pizzey. In the United States, the first was
Del Martin's Battered Wives, published in 1976. More than ten books on
the subject were published in the seventies. Accordingly, by 1980 the
stage was set for an onslaught of public attention. In 1980 alone, seven
law journal articles and at least five books on the issue of battered women
were published. And by the end of 1988, over 120 law journal articles
and more than 50 books focusing on domestic violence had been pub-
lished in that partial decade. My ABF-generated seminal articles were
repeatedly cited by the next early writers on the subject and continue to
43. Id. at 644.
44. Response of Some Relevant Community Resources, supra note 33.
45. The Relevance of Criminal Law, supra note 33.
46. Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259 (1971).
47. Allister & Levy, Impact of the New Family Offense Legislation, 50 N.Y. ST. B.J. 648 (1978);
Buzawa & Buzawa, Legislative Responses to the Problem of Domestic Violence in Michigan, 25
WAYNE L. REv. 859 (1979); Eisenberg & Seymour, The Self-Defense Plea and Battered Women, 14
TRIAL 34 (1978); Thompson, Representing the Accused Charged with an Intra-Family Violence Of-
fense, 18 PRAc. LAW. 41 (1972, part 8); Note, Domestic Relations: The Protection from Abuse
Act,.. . 51 TEMP. L.Q. 116 (1978); Note, Relief for Victims of Intra.Family Assaults. The Penn-
sylvania Protection from Abuse Act, 81 DiCK. L. REv.,815 (1977); Panel Workshop: Violence, Crime,
Sexual Abus4 and Addiction, 5 CONTEMP. DRUG. PROB. 385 (1976).
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be referrenced despite the subsequent glut of literature on the subject.4"
Focused research, specialized lobbying organizations, voluminous leg-
islation, and litigation demanding appropriate governmental action fol-
lowed closely upon this inverse publication pyramid. The ABF survey
data, publicized and expanded upon by Goldstein, LaFave, Miller, my-
self, and the President's Crime Commission in the sixties, contributed to
the dramatic change in public and institutional recognition of the domes-
tic violence problem. But, undoubtedly, the Women's and Victim's
Rights Movements, which were well under way by the early seventies,
were much more important focusing influences. Individual adherents,
popularized writing, burgeoning quasi-political organizations' rapid
growth and actions, and the consequent coverage of a "new" hot topic by
the mass media49 all greatly contributed to pushing domestic violence to
the front of public consciousness much faster than scholarly articles and
books could. The possible negative implications of this all too common
public policy scenario will be discussed later, but for the moment, Virgie
Lemond Mouton is probably correct in writing: "With the advent of
Women's Liberation,.. . women began speaking out against wife abuse
and demanding solutions from the police, the legislatures, other women,
churches and other social help organizations."5 °
Erin Pizzey is credited, by those unfamiliar with the earlier writings,
with first bringing the problem of wife abuse to the public's attention. In
1971 she organized a center where women could discuss mutual
problems. Pizzey published the first book about abused women in Eng-
land in 1974.51 By 1975, the National Organization for Women estab-
fished a National Task Force on Battered Women/Household Violence.
In 1976, an International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women met in
Brussels to testify about the victimization of women. Del Martin's Bat-
48. A comprehensive English language bibliography, which includes government publications,
conference papers, master's theses, doctoral dissertations, directives, handbooks, pamphlets and pop-
ular periodicals, had 1783 entries through 1983. E. ENGELDINGER, SPOUSE ABUSE: AN ANNO-
TATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN MATES (1986).
49. The intentional use of the mass media to publicize the Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment, which led to subsequent emphasis on the arrest response is acknowledged by one of the
primary researchers, Lawrence Sherman. Sherman & Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal Pol-
icy: the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 LAW & Soc'y REV. 117 (1989). For criti-
cism of that intentional publicity, see Lempert, Humility Is a Virtue." On the Publicization of Policy-
Relevant Research, 23 LAW & Soc'y REV. 145 (1989).
50. Note, Wife Abuse Legislation in California, Pennsylvania and Texas, 7 T. MARSHALL L.
REv. 282 (1982).
51. E. PIZZEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR (U.S. publication 1977).
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tered Wives, published in 1976, was also quite influential, as was Faith
McNulty's 1980 book, The Burning Bed, particularly in its graphic TV-
movie adaptation starring Farrah Fawcett. After these efforts, the news
media and city and state government officials recognized wife abuse as a
social problem.
Organizations on a national, state, and local level proliferated and be-
gan to gather and distribute information, lobby for legislation and policy
changes, institute litigation, form new organizations, and provide direct
victim assistance. At the national level are the National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence, the National Woman Abuse Prevention Pro-
ject, the Family Violence Project of the Center for Women's Policy Stud-
ies, and the National Clearing House on Domestic Violence. Most
states, if not all, have similar organizations such as Minnesota's Coalition
for Battered Women. There are also relevant State Attorney Generals'
task forces. At the local level, direct services to victims exist in many
places (for example, Sacramento's WEAVE - Women Escaping a Violent
Environment). Now available are domestic violence hotlines, crisis shel-
ters, handbooks, victim's guides, and pamphlets that try to lead unedu-
cated victims step-by-step through the protective order filing process.
Being a victim or battered spouse advocate has become a new vocation or
avocation for many, just as some academicians have made research and
writing about this problem their life's work.
II. THE PRESENT
So what, if anything, has been accomplished beyond the dramatic
change from very low visibility to very high visibility? Depending on
one's point of view, the answer to this question may be "a great deal,"
"not very much," or anything in between. Certainly more victims now
know they are not alone in their suffering, that what is happening to
them is viewed as wrong by society, and that many alternatives are avail-
able to them-especially the creation of hidden crisis shelters providing
short-term safe housing and counseling.
Domestic violence shelters were the earliest, simplest, most direct, and
still most effective societal response as the extent of the problem became
widely known. Legislative response followed. For example, despite con-
tinual funding problems, the California legislature enacted the Domestic
Violence Centers Act52 in 1977 to help fund such shelters, first on a pilot
52. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 18290-18307 (West Supp. 1991).
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project basis and then permanently in 1980. The Act's purpose section
provides: "It is the intention of the Legislature to begin to explore and
determine ways of achieving reductions in serious and fatal injuries to the
victims of domestic violence and begin to clarify the problems, causes,
and cures of domestic violence."53 The Act further provided that "the
state shall support projects in several areas throughout the state for the
purpose of aiding victims of domestic violence by providing them a place
to escape the destructive environment."54
Alternatives and process responses, other than crisis shelters, are much
more problematic. Let's examine one jurisdiction, California, and chart
many of the legislative changes that have taken place up to the current
time. In 1945, California Penal Code section 273d was enacted. It dis-
tinguished wife assault, providing that "any husband who willfully in-
flicts upon his wife corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition, but
not constituting a felonious assault or attempted murder... is neverthe-
less guilty of a felony.... ." In 1977 this part of P.C. 273d became P.C.
273.5, and the new provision became applicable to either spouse "or any
person who wilfully inflicts upon any person of the opposite sex with
whom he or she is cohabiting."55 The maximum imprisonment was
increased from three to four years in 1980. However, under California
law, this crime can also be treated as a misdemeanor if the prosecutor so
charges. The statute additionally specifies that, unless a finding of inap-
propriateness is made, "supervised counseling" is to be a condition of any
probation order.
53. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18290 (West Supp. 1991).
54. Id. Also, the legislature summarized in the purpose section the issue of domestic violence
in 1980:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that there is a present and growing need to
develop innovative strategies and services which will ameliorate and reduce the trauma of
domestic violence. There are hundreds of thousands of persons in this state who are regu-
larly beaten. In many such cases, the acts of domestic violence lead to the death of one of
the involved parties. Victims of domestic violence come from all socioeconomic classes
and ethnic groups, though it is the poor who suffer most from marital violence since they
have no immediate access to private counseling and shelter for themselves and their chil-
dren. Children, even when they are not physically assaulted, very often suffer deep and
lasting emotional effects, and it is most often the children of those parents who commit
domestic violence that continue the cycle and abuse their spouses.
The Legislature further finds and declares that there is a high incidence of deaths and
injuries sustained by law enforcement officers in the handling of domestic disturbances.
Police arrests for domestic violence are low, and victims are reluctant to press charges or
make citizens arrests. Furthermore, instances of domestic violence are considered to be the
single most unreported crime in the state.
Id.
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1991).
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In 1988, California further tightened section 273.5's probation provi-
sions, requiring a minimum of ninety-six hours county jail time, success-
ful completion of a one-year "batterer's treatment program" for a second
conviction within seven years, and a minimum of thirty days in jail, plus
the treatment program if two or more convictions under this section in
the previous seven years.56 A showing of "good cause" is required for
the court to waive these mandatory minimums.
In 1989, A.B. 238 was passed and sent to the governor to amend Penal
Code section 243's misdemeanor battery provisions by increasing the
maximum jail incarceration from six months to one year and adding a
mandatory one-year batterer's treatment program when probation is or-
dered if the offense "is committed against a noncohabiting former spouse,
fiance6, fianc&e, or a person with whom the defendant currently has, or
has previously had, a dating relationship."5" However, A.B. 238 is some-
what ameliorated by the 1979 legislation, which enacted P.C. 1000.6 et
seq., authorizing the diversion of those charged with misdemeanors in-
volving an act of domestic violence, other than P.C. 273.5 or assault with
a deadly weapon, if they had no conviction of a crime of violence within
seven years, had never had probation or parole revoked, and had not
been diverted within the last five years. A protective order and treatment
program may be conditions of the six-month to two-year diversion.
Criminal charges are dismissed if diversion is satisfactorily completed,
otherwise they are resumed.
California criminal legislation in 1979 also saw the addition of a
spousal rape provision by P.C. 262. P.C. 261 previously defined rape to
exclude one's spouse. Now spousal rape differs from other rape in that 1)
spousal rape must be reported within ninety days of its occurrence, and
2) it may be treated as a misdemeanor or as any other rape - straight
felony and punishable by three, six, or eight years imprisonment.58
The California Penal Code now also provides for a variety of court
orders to facilitate the reporting of crimes and the testimony of witnesses
and victims. These sections provide both misdemeanor and felony penal-
ties for those who dissuade witnesses from testifying or victims from re-
porting crimes in violation of such court orders. 59
On the civil front, the first of a long series of assault-specific protective
56. Id.
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(e) (West Supp. 1991).
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1988).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 136.1-136.2 (West Supp. 1991).
[Vol. 69:107
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss1/7
1991] RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
order statutes was enacted in 1969. In order to prevent continuing physi-
cal or emotional harm, California Civil Code section 51026 provided for
the exclusion of the assaulter from the family home (or from the home of
the assaulted party) when both were parties to either divorce, annulment
or separate maintenance proceedings. In 1979, a showing of a prior as-
sault or threat was required.61 Many other protective order provisions
followed. By 1989 the California civil arsenal included the following
most noteworthy provisions that authorize the court to issue an ex parte
order enjoining a party from certain violent acts;62 provide for a tempo-
rary restraining order "upon reasonable proof of a past act or acts of
actual violence resulting in physical injury...; 63 establish an on-site
field procedure for emergency protective orders against both marital and
nonmarital household members;6 and provide for maximum fines and
jail sentences for violations of any domestic violence-related order.65
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5102 (West Supp. 1991).
61. Id. at § 4359.
62. California Civil Code § 4359 authorizes the court in pending dissolution proceedings to
issue an ex parte order "enjoining any party from contacting, molesting, attacking, striking, threat-
ening, sexually assaulting, battering, or disturbing the peace." Provisions are made for immediate
notification of the order to law enforcement agencies and "each appropriate law enforcement agency
shall make available... information as to the existence, terms and current status of any order issued
. .to any law enforcement officer responding to the scene of reported domestic violence." CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4359 (West Supp. 1991).
63. California Code of Civil Procedure § 527, CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 527 (West 1990), pro-
vides for an ex parte maximum 30-day temporary restraining order to any person "residing with the
defendant at the time of the incident, upon reasonable proof of a past act or acts of actual violence
resulting in physical injury for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of actual domestic violence
and assuring a period of separation." Law enforcement notification provisions are similar to (I)
above.
64. California Code of Civil Procedure § 546, CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 546 (West Supp. 1991),
establishes an on-site field procedure for emergency ex parte protective orders against both marital
and nonmarita household members. The provision requires a designated judge to be on call when
court is not in session. He may orally issue these orders upon receiving a call from a law enforce-
ment agency asserting "reasonable grounds to believe a person is in immediate and present danger of
domestic violence." Id. The law enforcement agency's assertion must be based upon the victim's
allegation of a recent incident of abuse or threat. If the officer receives judicial ,approval he com-
pletes a Judicial Council form, signs it, gives a copy to the victim, attempts to serve the offender, and
files a copy in court. The victim has only until the end of the next judicial day to appear in court for
a possible extension of the order (for up to three years) or it terminates. A similar law has existed in
Colorado since 1982. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-4-103 (West 1989).
65. Violation of any of the numerous domestic violence-related orders constitutes a misde-
meanor punishable by as much as S1000 fine and a maximum of six months in jail. CAL. PENAL
CODE 273.6(a) (West Supp. 1991). A violation involving physical injury mandates a minimum 48-
hour incarceration. Id at § 273.6(b). A 1988 amendment raised the possibility of confinement for a
repeat order violation involving violence or "a credible threat" of violence within seven years of a
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By 1989 all but two states provided for some kind of special protective
orders in domestic violence cases. Use of these orders is growing (9000
in Chicago and 4000 in Portland in 1988). Criticism of this remedy is
primarily directed at deficiencies in implementation and enforcement and
not at the existence of the protective order itself. Studies sponsored by
the National Institute of Justice and conducted in major cities are soon to
be published. These studies are aimed at improving court procedures
and enforcement of protective orders.66
The overlap of the criminal and civil processes is demonstrated by the
attention given to enforcing protective orders by the California legisla-
ture. By the mid-1980s, with civil and criminal remedies in place, re-
formers now appeared to focus their efforts for change on the problem of
enforcment. In 1984 and 1985, California passed unique laws specifically
affecting the training and field practices of police officers as well as the
internal administration and charging practices of prosecutors regarding
domestic violence.67 The statutes cover an incredibly broad range of in-
cidents. Domestic violence, for the purposes of these Acts, is defined as
causing or attempting to cause "bodily injury to, or placing.., an adult
or fully emancipated minor who is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant,
former cohabitant, or a person with whom the suspect has had a child or
has or has had a dating or engagement relationship... [in] reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to herself or another."68
The purpose provision of the 1984 Act, entitled "Law Enforcement
Response to Domestic Violence," reads:
The Legislature finds and declares that:
(a) A significant number of homicides, aggravated assaults, and assaults
and batteries occur within the home between adult members of families.
Research shows that 35 to 40 percent of all assaults are related to domestic
violence.
(b) The reported incidence of domestic violence represents only a portion
of the total number of incidents of domestic violence.
(c) Twenty-three percent of the deaths of law enforcement officers in the
line of duty results from intervention by law enforcement officers in inci-
dents of domestic violence.
prior-order violation from one year in jail to three years in prison. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6(a)
(West Supp. 1991).
66. Wiener, Inadequate Enforcement Seen on Courts' Protection Orders, 20 CRIM. I NEWSLET-
TER No. 8 at 4-5 (Apr. 17, 1989).
67. See infra notes 69, 75 and accompanying text.
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700 (West Supp. 1991).
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(d) Domestic violence is a complex problem affecting families from all so-
cial and economic backgrounds.
The purpose of this act is to address domestic violence as a serious crime
against society and to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum
protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can
provide. It is the intent of the Legislature that the official response to cases
of domestic violence shall stress the enforcement of the laws to protect the
victim and shall communicate the attitude that violent behavior in the
home is criminal behavior and will not be tolerated. It is not the intent of
the Legislature to hold individual peace officers liable.69
Despite the legislature's explicit recognition of the complexity of domes-
tic violence and express authorization of a continuation of individual dis-
cretion in these matters, it clearly encourages the invocation of the
criminal process.
Because of the uniqueness of detailed, individual crime-focused legisla-
tion specifying the content of police training, California Penal Code sec-
tion 13519 is set out in full:
Domestic violence complaints; training course and guidelines for handling;
requirements
(a) The commission [on Peace Officer Standards and Training] shall imple-
ment by January 1, 1986, a course or courses of instruction for the training
of law enforcement officers in California in the handling of domestic vio-
lence complaints and also shall develop guidelines for law enforcement re-
sponse to domestic violence. The course or courses of instruction and the
guidelines shall stress enforcement of criminal laws in domestic violence
situations, availability of civil remedies and community resources, and pro-
tection of the victim. Where appropriate, the training presenters shall in-
clude domestic violence experts with expertise in the delivery of direct
services to victims of domestic violence, including utilizing the staff of shel-
ters for battered women in the presentation of training.
As used in this section, "law enforcement officer" means any officer or em-
ployee of a local police department or sheriff's office.
(b) The course of basic training for law enforcement officers shall, no later
than January 1, 1986, include adequate instruction in the procedures and
techniques described below:
(1) The provisions set forth in Title 5 (commencing with Section 13700)
relating to response, enforcement of court orders, and data collection.
(2) The legal duties imposed on police officers to make arrests and offer
protection and assistance including guidelines for making felony and misde-
meanor arrests.
69. 1984 Cal. Stat. c. 1609, § 1.
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
126 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
(3) Techniques for handling incidents of domestic violence that minimize
the likelihood of injury to the officer and that promote the safety of the
victim.
(4) The nature and extent of domestic violence.
(5) The legal rights of, and remedies available to, victims of domestic
violence.
(6) The use of an arrest by a private person in a domestic violence situation
(7) Documentation, report writing, and evidence collection.
(8) Domestic violence diversion as provided in Chapter 2.6 (commencing
with Section 1000.6) of Title 6 of Part 2.
(9) Tenancy issues and domestic violence.
(10) The impact on children of law enforcement intervention in domestic
violence.
(11) The services and facilities available to victims and batterers.
(12) The use and applications of this code in domestic violence situations.
(13) Verification and enforcement of temporary restraining orders when
(A) the suspect is present and (B) the suspect has fled.
(14) Verification and enforcement of stay-away orders.
(15) Cite and release policies.
(16) Emergency assistance to victims and how to assist victims in pursuing
criminal justice options.
The guidelines developed by the commission shall also incorporate the fore-
going factors.
(c) All law enforcement officers who have received their basic training
before January 1, 1986, shall participate in supplementary training on do-
mestic violence subjects, as prescribed and certified by the commission.
This training shall be completed no later than January 1, 1989....
Local law enforcement agencies are encouraged to include, as part of their
advanced officer training program, periodic updates and training on domes-
tic violence. The commission shall assist where possible.
(d) The course of instruction, the learning and performance objectives, the
standards for the training, and the guidelines shall be developed by the
commission in consultation with appropriate groups and individuals having
an interest and expertise in the field of domestic violence. The groups and
individuals shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following: one
representative each from the California Peace Officers' Association, the
Peace Officers' Research Association of California, the State Bar of Califor-
nia, the California Women Lawyers' Association, and the State Commis-
sion on the Status of Women; two representatives from the commission;
two representatives from the California Alliance Against Domestic Vio-
lence; two peace officers, recommended by the commission, who are exper-
ienced in the provision of domestic violence training; and two domestic
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violence experts, recommended by the California Alliance Against Domes-
tic Violence, who are experienced in the provision of direct services to vic-
tims of domestic violence. At least one of the persons selected shall be a
former victim of domestic violence.
The commission, in consultation with these groups and individuals, shall
review existing training programs to determine in what ways domestic vio-
lence training might be included as a part of ongoing programs.
(e) Forty thousand dollars ($40,000)f is appropriated from the Peace Of-
ficers Training Fund in augmentation of Item 8120-001-268 of the Budget
Act of 1984, to support the travel, per diem, and associated costs for con-
vening the necessary experts.?
This Act also mandated the implementation of written policies avail-
able to the public on request, establishing standards for the police re-
sponse that would reflect domestic violence as criminal conduct "the
same as" any other violent act.7 1 Not stopping with this mandate, the
legislature again took the unusual step of specifying the standards and
policies for domestic violence complaints in California Penal Code sec-
tion 13701.72
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519 (West Supp. 1991).
71. Id. § 13701.
72. (a) Felony arrests.
(b) Misdemeanor arrests.
(c) Use of citizen arrests.
(d) Verification and enforcement of temporary restraining orders when (1) the suspect is
present and (2) when the suspect has fled.
(e) Verification and enforcement of stay-away orders.
(f) Cite and release policies.
(g) Emergency assistance to victims, such as medical care, transportation to a shelter, and
police standbys for removing personal property.
(h) Assisting victims in pursuing criminal options, such as giving the victim the report
number and directing the victim to the proper investigation unit.
(i) Furnishing written notice to victims at the scene, including, but not limited to, all of the
following information:
(IXA) A statement that, "For further information about a shelter you may contact
_ _ " (B) A statement that, "For information about other services in the com-
munity, where available, you may contact __ ."
(2) A statement informing the victim of domestic violence that he or she can ask the
district attorney to file a criminal complaint.
(3) A statement informing the victim of the right to go to the superior court and file a
petition requesting any of the following orders for relief.
(A) An order restraining the attacker from abusing the victim and other family
members.
(B) An order directing the attacker to leave the household.
(C) An order preventing the attacker from entering the residence, school, business, or
place of employment of the victim.
(D) An order awarding the victim or the other parent custody of or visitation with a
minor child or children.
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Data collection and recordkeeping provisions are also part of this Act.
The legislation was undoubtedly influenced by the Police Executive Re-
search Forum's 1980 report entitled Responding to Spouse Abuse & Wife
Beating7 3 by Nancy Loving which, like the Challenge of Crime,74 much
earlier, emphasized written policies and operational guidelines.
In 1985, the California legislature continued its unique crime-specific
guide to law enforcement with the Spousal Abusers Act directed at pros-
ecution policy and practice.75 However, unlike its detailed police man-
dates, the legislature established a program of financial and technical
assistance as a carrot to those District Attorneys' offices creating a
Spousal Abuser Prosecution Program under the Act's guidelines .76 This
Act begins with the following "Legislative Findings":
The Legislature hereby finds that spousal abusers present a clear and pres-
ent danger to the mental and physical well-being of the citizens of the State
of California. The Legislature further finds that the concept of vertical
prosecution, in which a specially trained deputy district attorney or prose-
cution unit is assigned to a case from its filing to its completion, is a proven
way of demonstrably increasing the likelihood of convicting spousal abusers
and ensuring appropriate sentences for those offenders. In enacting this
chapter, the Legislature intends to support increased efforts by district at-
torneys' offices to prosecute spousal abusers through organizational and op-
erational techniques that have already proven their effectiveness in selected
(E) An order restraining the attacker from molesting or interfering with minor chil-
dren in the custody of the victim.
(F) An order directing the party not granted custody to pay support of minor children,
if that party has a legal obligation to do so.
(G) An order directing the defendant to make specified debit payments coming due
while the order is in effect.
(H) An order directing that either or both parties participate in counseling.
(4) A statement informing the victim of the right to file a civil suit for losses suffered as
a result of the abuse, including medical expenses, loss of earnings, and other expenses
for injuries sustained and damage to property, and any other related expenses incurred
by the victim or any agency that shelters the victim.
(I) Writing of reports.
In the development of these policies and standards, each local department is en-
couraged to consult with domestic violence experts, such as the staff of the local shelter
for battered women and their children. Departments may utilize the response guide-
lines developed by the commission in developing local policies.
Id. at § 13701.
73. N. LOVING, RESPONDING TO SPOUSE ABUSE & WIFE BEATING, A GUIDE FOR POLICE
(1980).
74. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 25.
75. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.8 (West 1991).
76. Id at § 273.81.
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counties in this and other states. 7
In addition to vertical prosecution and highly-qualified prosecutors,
the legislature requires highly-qualified investigators, a vertical counselor
liaison, a significant reduction in caseload, and a variety of coordination
efforts with relevant community groups.7" Any person arrested for the
broadly defined acts specified earlier can be proceeded against by this
special unit. 9
"[A] district attorney shall not reject cases for filing exclusively on the
basis that there is a family or personal relationship between the victim
and the alleged offender."'  However, extraordinary circumstances may
require the reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion to depart from
the policies of the Act." In exercising this discretion the prosecutor
must consider the number and seriousness of the currently alleged of-
fenses.82 Otherwise, subject to the diversion provisions previously indi-
cated,8 3 the district attorney shall: a) resist pretrial release; b) reduce the
time between arrest and disposition; and c) persuade the court to impose
the most severe authorized sentence."
The current fuller enforcement trend, exemplified by the 1984 and
1985 California Acts above, orginated in some of the early ABF schol-
arly writings, a Police Executive Research Forum report, litigation, and
Minnesota research. Joseph Goldstein discussed this general issue in
1960.85 He favorably described a late 1950s experiment in full enforce-
ment by the Oakland Police Department. Despite the fact that the deci-
sion to prosecute vested pragmatically in the victims, the rate of
unspecified felonious and misdemeanor assaults reported increased from
93 to 161 and 618 to 2,630 respectively between 1952 and 1956.86 Ac-
77. Id. at § 273.8.
78. Id. at § 273.82.
79. Id. at § 273.83. See supra text accompanying note 55.
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.83(b) (West 1988).
81. Id. at § 273.85(a).
82. Id at § 273.83(c).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.84 (West 1988). Elsewhere, Lisa Lerman formulated comprehen-
sive legislation into "A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse." Lerman, A Model State
Act: Remediesfor Domestic Abuse, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 61 (1984). For charts of all state legisla-
tion as of 1983, see Lerman & Livingston, State legislation on Domestic Violence, 6 REsPONSE 1
(Center for Women Policy Studies, Sept./Oct. 1983). Also, in 1984 Congress enacted the Family
Violence Prevention and Services to Assist States Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10413 (1988).
85. Goldstein, supra note 5.
86. Id. at 577-80.
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cording to the Police Academy Instructor's Manual87 these figures indi-
cated "an increasing lack of respect for the laws of society by a
measurable segment of our population, and a corresponding threat to the
rest of the citizens of our city .... We recognize that the problem exists
mainly because the injured person has refused to sign a complaint against
the perpetrator." 8 The manual stated that the cause of the problem was
a combination of the victim's refusal to sign a complaint against the per-
petrator, 9 and the police's failure to "[take] advantage of the means at
[their] disposal; that is, [not gather] sufficient evidence and [sign] com-
plaints on information and belief in those cases where the complainant
refuses to prosecute."'
As a result, a full enforcement policy was implemented in Oakland and
coordinated with prosecutors and judges. The DA was to deny a com-
plainant's request to drop charges and suggest it be directed to the court.
The judge was then to advise that the case would not be dismissed and
that perjury, contempt, or false report charges would be brought against
the victim if she failed to follow through. Goldstein acknowledged that
the subsequent drop of reported assaults and batteries needed follow-up
evaluation to determine whether the actual number of such incidents had
been reduced or only the number of reports.91 Nonetheless, his conclu-
sion in the overall theoretical context of generalized police discretion
was:
The mandate offull enforcement, under circumstances which compel selec-
tive enforcement, has placed the municipal police in an intolerable posi-
tion .... Legislatures, therefore, ought to reconsider what discretion, if
any, the police must or should have in invoking the criminal process....
The ultimate answer is that the police should not be delegated discretion
87. Id. at 577 n.71 (citing Police Academy, Oakland, Cal., Police Dep't Instructor's Material,
Vol. 6, Bull. No. 35, Aug. 26, 1957, p. 2).
88. Id. at 578.
89. Id. at 578. "The injured person has usually refused to sign for two reasons: first, because of
threats of future bodily harm or other action by the perpetrator and, secondly, because it has been a
way of life among some people to adjust grievances by physical assaults and not by the recognized
laws of society which are available to them." Id.
90. Id. The Police Academy Instructor's manual further stated:
The policy and procedure of gathering sufficient evidence and signing complaints on infor-
mation and belief should instill in these groups the realization that the laws of society must
be resorted to in settling disputes. When it is realized by many of these people that we will
sign complaints ourselves and will not condone fighting and cuttings, many of them will
stop such practices.
Id. at 578-579 (footnotes omitted).
91. Id. at 579-80.
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not to invoke the criminal law. It is recognized, of course, that the exercise
of discretion cannot be completely eliminated where human beings are in-
volved. The frailties of human language and human perception will always
admit of borderline cases.... But nonetheless, outside this margin of ambi-
guity, the police should operate in an atmosphere which exhorts and com-
mands them to invoke impartially all criminal laws within the bounds of
full enforcement. If a criminal law is ill-advised, poorly defined, or too
costly to enforce, efforts by the police to achieve full enforcement should
generate pressures for legislative action. Responsibility for the enactment,
amendment, and repeal of the criminal laws will not, then, be abandoned to
the whim of each police officer or department, but retained where it belongs
in a democracy-with elected representatives.92
By 1970, Oakland was utilizing the Bard approach to family crisis in-
tervention with emphasis on problem-solving and referral rather than
arrest and prosecution. Preliminary statistics after three months showed
significantly fewer repeat calls using this approach as well.9 3
LaFave held a more pessimistic view than Goldstein. He believed that
the more likely effect of a continued policy of full enforcement would be
a reduction in "the number of complaints when it became known that the
spouse would be put in jail as a consequence of any complaint made."9 4
LaFave concluded that such a reduction "would not necessarily be desir-
able, particularly if no other agency were ready to assume the task of
mediating family disputes which had been handled by the police." 95
In my first article in 1967, I also briefly discussed the two extremes of
full enforcement and no response and concluded:
Neither of the two extremes in the spectrum of police alternatives in han-
dling the domestic disturbance is practical. On the one hand, the police
could choose to arrest family members and intimates for any infraction of
the law in an effort to reduce the volume of these calls for service. The
increase in arrests would appear to place an extremely difficult burden on
the police and the courts. More importantly, such a practice fails to recog-
nize the domestic causes of these disputes and completely ignores the value
in supporting family relationships without disruption. Therefore, although
complaints might decrease, the disturbances would continue unchecked be-
hind closed doors until, in some cases, serious violence would result. Per-
haps most importantly, such a full enforcement policy (control, untempered
92. Id. at 586-88 (footnotes omitted).
93. Police Discretion, supra note 33, at 556.
94. W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 145-46.
95. Id.
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by support) would undoubtedly increase the alienation of the ghetto popu-
lation from the police.
On the other hand, the police might refuse to respond to domestic distur-
bance calls, maintaining that adjustment is not a legitimate police function.
However, these calls are for immediate assistance and occur around-the-
clock; they are uncertain in nature until an officer is on the scene; they often
involve the need for apparent authority; and they sometimes require the
actual use of legitimate force and other traditional police sanctions. 9
6
Ten years later, however, I switched my emphasis from adjustment to
invocation of the criminal law by arrest.97 The reasons for such a switch
are as follows:
In the last ten years recognition of the peace-keeping role of the police and
the exorbitant amount of criminal justice agency time spent on relatively
minor family disputes has led to systematic attempts to deal with this prob-
lem. . . . The compassion and humanity of the social services has been
increasingly interjected to effect more organized and 'knowledgeable' efforts
at diversion, counseling, referral, mediation and treatment.... The trouble
with such a trend for inter-spousal violence now is that the juvenile and
adult processes, in the United States at least, confronted with intolerable
rates of delinquency and criminality, have recently been discarding and re-
thinking the commendable, but still unproven, facets of models based on
sickness, treatment and rehabilitation, and have been returning to the
known entities of accountability for bad acts, with appropriate and ac-
knowledged punishment, enlightened and softened somewhat by prior expe-
rience with the social services.9 8
Using Frank Allen's classic 1964 analysis9 9 of the "problems of social-
izing criminal justice" with regard to other incidents on "the borderland
of the criminal law" to answer the central question regarding an appro-
priate process response for intrafamily violence, I concluded:
Efforts at therapy can, and I suppose should, be included in the process but
should not be given undue emphasis, for there is simply no evidence that we
know how to diagnose, much less treat, disputants' problems in a manner
that will prevent repetition. Simply put, we must go with what we know.
And we know that we cannot ignore or condone acts or threats of imminent
violence. We know that the police are best equipped to protect others and
96. Police Response, supra note 33, at 948 (footnotes omitted).
97. The Relevance of Criminal Law, supra note 33. This paper was first presented at the Sec-
ond World Conference of the International Society of Family Law in Montreal.
98. Id. at 188-189.
99. Allen, The Borderland of the Criminal Law: Problems of "Socializing" Criminal Justice, in
THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964).
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themselves. We know how to punish, whether by fine, incapacitation, other
denials of full liberty, embarrassment, inconvenience, etc. And we know
punishment is a clear statement of the personal responsibility of the of-
fender and the condemnation and retribution of society. We also know that
where punishment is to be imposed, the criminal process provides the best
safeguards that such punishment is imposed on the appropriate person
under the most adequate circumstances. We know that incapacitation pre-
vents repetition during the period of incarceration. Finally I submit that we
are increasingly coming to believe that punishment, quickly, fairly, propor-
tionately and appropriately imposed, may deter or reduce the quality and
quantity of some kinds of bad conduct at least as well, if not better, than
attempts at speculative therapy, and thus may serve the rehabilitation func-
tion even better from the perspective of non-repetition.
Thus the criminal law, the police, the prosecutor and the courts should not
only continue to respond to incidents of inter-spousal violence, but should
emphasize the importance of the traditional response of arrest, prosecution
and sanction as a sign of public disapprobation and protection, not only at
the upper levels of violence, but also at the first minimal signs of trouble.l1°
At the prosecution level, 10 ' many in 1978 at the Center for Women's
Policy Studies and the National DA's Association Family Violence Con-
ference in Memphis urged fuller enforcement. "No drop" policies, how-
ever, are considerably more controversial among domestic violence
reformers than is mandatory arrest, probably because its onus falls more
on the alleged victim. For example, in a few instances, uncooperative
complainants have arguably been victimized a second time by being held
in contempt and jailed for refusing to testify. The arguments against "no
drop" policies by many proponents of mandatory arrest illustrate both
the complexity and variety of domestic violence incidents and the gender
politics surrounding the ongoing reforms in this area over much of the
last two decades. For example:
In family violence cases, the pressure not to prosecute can be overwhelm-
ing. Many battered women face verbal harassment and intimidation not to
press and pursue charges, and the threat of further physical violence, even
murder, if they do. Given the alarmingly high rates of spousal homicide,
these fears are legitimate. Sometimes a battered woman drops charges
against her husband because he pleads with her not to carry through with
prosecution, promising not to hurt her again. Hoping that he will keep that
100. The Relevance of Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 190-191.
101. For a recent article on prosecutorial discretion in spouse abuse cases, see Schmidt & Stevry,
Prosecutorial Discretion in Filing Charges in Domestic Violence Cases, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 487 (1989).
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promise, she may decide to give him another chance. Many battered wo-
men fear that their husbands will be jailed if they proceed with prosecution.
Concern about loss of financial support if their husbands are incarcerated,
fear of family reprisal, and a wish to save face in the community by settling
the dispute as quietly as possible, all act as deterrents to pursuing criminal
prosecution.
Some argue that any policy that denies victim discretion is patently offen-
sive. Others oppose no-drop policies on the grounds that they are not effec-
tive. They believe that a stricter criminal justice response will not solve the
problem of family violence and that efforts toward that end should focus on
eradicating sexism in society and educating people on safe and healthy ways
to resolve conflict. Most proponents of no-drop policies argue that while
victims should not be incarcerated for failure to cooperate with the courts,
these policies should be supported because they promote prosecution of
abusers and therefore protect family victims.
No-drop policies are frequently combined with non-punitive disposition op-
tions that mandate counseling for abusers in the hope that this will not only
be an effective form of intervention but one more acceptable to their vic-
tims. The penalties are frequently tailored to respond to the victim's objec-
tives in order to secure their cooperation. 102
If charges are brought and not dismissed, what is the effect of judicial
intervention? One National Institute of Justice study reported that only
fifty percent of such cases resulted in conviction, and one-third of these
victims suffered renewed abuse within two to three months. 10 3 Neverthe-
less, because the re-arrest rate was only ten percent, and the arrest out-
come satisfied more than half of the victims, researchers reached the
conclusion that judges play a critical role in deterring future violence in
two ways: "First, judicial warnings and/or lectures to defendants con-
cerning the inappropriateness and seriousness of their violent behavior
apparently improved the future conduct of some defendants. Second,
judges occasionally counseled victims by telling them that they should
not tolerate violent abuse and/or suggesting counseling programs."'10
4
102. "No-Drop" Prosecution Policies Sometimes Backfire Against Victims, 7 RESPONSE 1, 5.6
(Center for Women Policy Studies, May/June 1984).
103. Courts'Response to Battered Women Evaluated, 7 RESPONSE 4, 4 (Center for Women Pol-
icy Studies, March/April 1982) (citing B. SMrrH, NON-STRANGER VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
COURTS' RESPONSE (National Institute of Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice 1983)).
104. Id. at 10 (quoting B. SMrrH, NON-SnRANGER VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL COURTS' RE-
SPONSE (National Institute of Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice 1983)).
The study postulates that the judges' conduct is especially critical to those individuals, both
victims and defendants, who appear in court for the first time, and suggest that the effects
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One of the two most important causes of the full enforcement trend of
the 1980s is the growth of litigation about the issue, much of which has
been fostered by battered wives advocates.105 Increasingly, victims of do-
mestic violence have attempted to sue police departments, and through
them municipalities, alleging, among other things, that inadequate police
protection was responsible for their injuries. Until the mid-80s, most of
these suits were grounded in tort law. However, more recent cases have
involved claims of violations of constitutional rights. In the earlier cases,
the plaintiffs' proposed basis for recovery was the city's negligence in
failing to provide reasonable protection for victims of domestic violence.
The two main legal obstacles to recovery were (1) sovereign immunity,
which shielded the city, and (2) the police's duty of protection to society
as a whole, but not to individual citizens. Sovereign immunity has grad-
ually eroded.1"6 But without a breachable duty, no cause of action for
negligence could exist. A series of New York cases created a loophole
through this second barrier.
In Baker v. City of New York," °7 the court held that the existence of a
judicial protection order puts the police on notice that the named indi-
vidual has a special need for protection. This notice creates a special
duty of care owed by the police toward that individual. Although the
police do not normally owe a duty of protection to specific individuals,
the notice provided by a protection order can create such a duty.
In Bruno v. Codd,108 twelve battered women sued the New York City
Police Department, alleging that the police refused to assist them or to
arrest their husbands solely because the parties were married. Plaintiffs
and defendant entered into a consent judgment requiring police to re-
spond as soon as possible to all domestic calls in which a protection order
violation is reported.
Perhaps the most important of the New York cases was Sorichetti v.
City of New York." 9 A mother and daughter, who were both physically
of a judge's conduct on the cessation or resumption of violence is a topic worthy of further
study.
Id.
105. The other most important cause is the Minnesota research. See infra notes 147-54 and
accompanying text.
106. According to Mayhew, over 30 states have at least partially waived immunity. Mayhew,
The Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in Mississippi: The Legislative Problem, 3 Mms. C. L. REv.
209, 220-23 (1983).
107. 269 N.Y.S.2d 515, 25 A.D.2d 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
108. 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. 1979).
109. 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (N.Y. 1985).
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abused by their husband/father, sued the City of New York for inade-
quate police protection which resulted in serious injuries to the daughter.
The woman had previously obtained a protection order against her hus-
band, but the courts had granted the husband visitation rights with their
daughter on weekends. While picking up his daughter from the police
station (as the order required) for his weekly visitation, the husband ut-
tered death threats against both his wife and daughter. The wife, who
was present, immediately reported the threats to the desk officer, but the
police refused to arrest the husband or to take any other action. During
that weekend visitation, the husband severely injured his daughter. The
New York Court of Appeals, applying Baker, held that the mere exist-
ence of the protection order established a special duty owed by the police
toward the mother because she was named in the order, but did not alone
create a duty toward the daughter, who was not named in the order."n
However, the court further held that the combination of the protection
order, the Police Department's knowledge of the husband's violence, and
the wife's reasonable reliance on the police to take action created a spe-
cial duty that extended to the daughter.III The duty created by a protec-
tion order, however, is not a duty of mandatory arrest but a duty to
investigate and to take appropriate action. 1 2
Many states now have mandatory arrest provisions,' 3 and some
courts have ruled on their enforcement. The Oregon Supreme Court, in
Nearing v. Weaver," 4 held that police could be held liable for emotional
stress caused by their failure to enforce a protective order under the
mandatory arrest provision of the State's Abuse Prevention Act.' 15 The
court buttressed this holding by ruling that because the determination of
probable cause was not discretionary, the defense of police immunity
from prosecution did not apply." 6
The constitutional cases have been based on two theories: (1) "due
process"-the police's failure to provide adequate protection from physi-
cal abuse violates the battered wife's fourteenth amendment right not to
be deprived of liberty without due process of law; and (2) "equal protec-
110. Id. at 469, 482 N.E.2d at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See, eg., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.99 (1989); Wis. STAT. § 968.075 (1989); see also Lerman
& Livingston, supra note 84.
114. 295 Ore. 702, 670 P.2d 137 (Or. 1983).
115. Id. at 708, 670 P.2d at 141.
116. Id at 710, 670 P.2d at 142.
[Vol. 69:107
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss1/7
RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
tion"-policies, customs, or practices of non-intervention or of lessened
intervention in spousal abuse cases than in other assault cases discrimi-
nates against a class of people by gender and marital status without a
compelling state interest in doing so.
The key opinion in this line of cases is Thurman v. City of Tor-
rington. 117 Following a particularly vicious attack, a mother and her son
sued the city and police for failing to respond adequately to repeated
assaults by the husband. The plaintiffs alleged violation of the equal pro-
tection clause because police consistently and systematically failed to
provide protection to victims of domestic violence. The plaintiffs won a
2.3 million dollar verdict. The district court held that the behavior
clearly resulted from a sex-based classification, and that the city must put
forth an important governmental interest for discriminating against wo-
men who are victims of domestic violence. The court stated that a man
may not physically abuse a woman solely because she is his wife. There-
fore, the court reasoned, a police officer may not knowingly refrain from
intervention or arrest solely because the victim and offender are married
to each other.
However, according to Amy Eppler,118 Thurman was decided on the
easier issue of sex discrimination. The court avoided having to decide
"the harder case"-an allegedly gender-neutral policy of police noninter-
vention in family matters. Thus, the equal protection clause has not yet
been applied to such a policy, and it is uncertain how it will be in future
cases. Eppler submits that standards laid down by other U.S. Supreme
Court decisions (unrelated to domestic violence) will make it difficult to
prove that such a policy is unconstitutional. 19 It would not be enough
to show that the policy harms women more than it does men, or that
such inequality was foreseeable to policymakers. The plaintiff would
need to prove discriminatory intent, that is, that lawmakers enacted or
reaffirmed the policy at least partly because of the inequality in harm
produced.
In Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 21 a federal district court in Michi-
gan further delineated Thurman's equal protection ruling. The plain-
tiff's husband physically abused her and also threatened her life. She
117. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). The 1989 TV movie "Cry for Help" was a reenactment
of this case.
118. Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 788 (1986).
119. Id. at 795.
120. 643 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
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reported this to a police officer, told him the make of her husband's car
and his place of work, and asked the officer to arrest him. The officer
told the plaintiff he would arrest her husband on the pretense of a traffic
violation. However, the officer failed to take any action at all. Two
weeks later, the plaintiff's husband shot and wounded the plaintiff and
then killed himself. The plaintiff sued the officer, the police chief, and
the township for, inter alia, violation of her constitutional right of equal
protection of the law.
The court held that the equal protection clause requires police officers
and agencies who are under affirmative duty to protect persons within
their area to fulfill that duty without intentionally discriminating against
persons on an irrational basis. Thus, police officers may be liable if they
have an affirmative duty and consciously breach it in a discriminatory
fashion; cities may be liable if they promulgate a broad policy with at
least partly discriminatory intent.
The court found that the complaints stated a cause of action against
the patrolman and also the police chief because of allegations of a con-
scious choice not to promulgate or enforce a policy of intervention in
spouse-abuse cases. However, as to the complaint against the township,
the court held that to state a claim of municipal liability, a plaintiff must
allege facts showing a broad municipal policy rather than just an isolated
action by a single non-policy-making wrongdoer.
The "due process" approach was tried along with the tested "equal
protection" approach in Dudosh v. City of Allentown.1 2' Dudosh in-
volved a suit brought by the administrator of the estate of a woman killed
by her live-in boyfriend who later committed suicide. The defendants
were the city and two police officers. Plaintiff claimed that the defend-
ants violated the decedent's constitutional rights of due process and equal
protection, and in a pendent state claim, that the police officers acted
with malice and willful misconduct in the manner in which they handled
the decedent's requests for assistance. Eleven days before the murder,
decedent complained to the police that her former live-in boyfriend,
against whom she had obtained a protection order, had attempted to
enter her apartment and had threatened to kill her. The responding of-
ficer filed a report to be turned over to a police detective for further inves-
tigation. However, no investigation took place. A memo filed by the
detective receiving the report stated that no follow-up on the matter
121. 665 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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should take place because of department policy "not to get involved in
matters of this nature." 122 The memo further stated that in most of these
matters the couples reunite anyway. 123
The court granted summary judgment for defendant with respect to
the due process claim. 124 The court explained that due process only pro-
hibits affirmative acts by government to deprive a person of life, liberty,
or property. It does not require government to guarantee citizens' life,
liberty, or property against private actors. Thus, inadequate police pro-
tection is not a denial of due process.1 25 However, with respect to the
equal protection claim, the court denied summary judgment for the de-
fendants.1 26 The court stated that although a city had no constitutional
duty to provide police protection, it must provide such service in a non-
discriminatory fashion if it does choose to do so. 27 The court also held
that a city may violate the equal protection clause merely by acquiescing
and failing to sanction employees for discriminatory conduct of which
city policymakers are aware.
12 8
The due process claim fared better in one of only two domestic vio-
lence lawsuits against police to be decided by a federal circuit court of
appeals at least through 1988. In Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.,129 a
battered wife in California sued a city and its police, claiming they had
denied her due process. The plaintiff repeatedly called police after suffer-
ing beatings and harassments by her husband. The police refused to
arrest or to investigate. On one occasion, when plaintiff's estranged hus-
band fire-bombed her house, the police took forty-five minutes to respond
to her 911 phone call. Police ridiculed plaintiff and tried to pressure her
not to press charges against her husband. Once they hung up on her as
she tried to report a vandalism by her husband.
The federal district court dismissed her claim. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that failure to respond to the hus-
band's continued threats, harassment, and violence implicated the wife's
right to be free from physical harm and restraint, a denial of her right to
liberty under the due process clause. The court further stated that the
122. Id. at 385.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 391.
125. Id. at 388.
126. Id. at 394.
127. Id. at 392.
128. Id. at 395.
129. 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988) (as amended 1990).
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complaint suggested an equal protection claim as well, and granted the
plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to include this claim expressly.
The other case decided by a U.S. circuit court of appeals is Watson v.
City of Kansas City, Kansas.130 In that case, the Tenth Circuit held that,
"[a]lthough there is no general constitutional right to police protection,
the state may not discriminate in providing such protection."1 31 The
court also held that in an equal protection suit, the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proving discriminatory intent, but that such intent need not have
been the sole purpose for the defendant's challenged actions. 132 A plain-
tiff need only prove that a discriminatory intent was a motivating factor.
The Supreme Court has not addressed these issues dealing with domes-
tic violence. However, a recent case may have important implications.
In City of Canton v. Harris,133 the Supreme Court held that a municipal-
ity may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when failure to train its
police officers results in violations of constitutional rights. 134 However,
in order for the city to be liable, its failure to train must result from
municipal policy, and this policy must have been the product of "deliber-
ate indifference" to the rights of the city's residents. 135 In other words, it
is not enough to establish that a police officer's lack of training results in
an unconstitutional injury (i.e. denial of due process or equal protection).
A plaintiff must also prove that it was the city's policy not to train its
officers adequately in the protection of that constitutional right. Thus,
inadequate training due to administrative error or laziness does not make
the city liable for constitutional infringement. The plaintiff must also
prove that the city's policy was made in deliberate indifference to citi-
zens' rights. Thus, inadequate training caused by tight budget con-
straints alone probably could not impose section 1983 liability. Probably
nothing short of a deliberate city decision not to train its officers to re-
spect the constitutional rights of citizens, made with reckless disregard
for such rights and with the strong probability that such rights will be
infringed, would pass the Harris test for section 1983 liability. Despite
the possibilities inherent in this case, the court seems concerned with
avoiding the exposure of municipalities to "unprecedented liability." It
130. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
131. Id. at 694.
132. Id.
133. 109 S. CL 1197 (1989).
134. Id. at 1200.
135. Id. at 1204-05.
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therefore avoids requiring the federal court system to "second-guess"
municipal employee training programs and avoids raising "serious ques-
tions of federalism" by intruding into local allocative and administrative
decisionmaking.
These are but a few of the reported cases beginning almost exclusively
in the 1970s. Many more are unreported, settled on the basis of this
growing judicial support for fuller enforcement of the criminal law, at
least at the police stage.
Litigation in a directly related area created an ironic twist to the fuller
enforcement of the laws against some acts of domestic violence by pro-
viding for dismissals, acquittals, or arguably too lenient sentences for
other acts of domestic violence. These cases almost always involve do-
mestic violence against men, and involve the concept of the Battered Wo-
man's Syndrome, popularized by Lenore Walker in her writings 136 and
her testimony in Ibn-Tamas v. United States.13 ' The Battered Woman's
Syndrome has been used in court either directly through the admissibility
of expert testimony13 8 and instructions, or indirectly through counsel's
136. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); L. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYN-
DROME (1984); L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SOCi-
ETY RESPONDS (1989).
137. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
138. For example, in People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989), the court held:
[It was error not to permit Dr. [Lenore E.] Walker to testify, based on her experience and
BWS theory, as to how the defendant's particular experiences as a battered woman affected
her perceptions of danger, its imminence, and what actions were necessary to protect her-
self. ... [However,] no matter what the expert testimony, it is not reasonably probable that
a jury would find defendant actually believed she was in imminent danger.... We find
that a different verdict was not reasonably probable if the erroneously excluded testimony
had been admitted.
In addition, Assembly Bill 2613 was introduced in the California Assembly on January 16, 1990, by
Assemblyman Jerry Eaves. It provides:
SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a) Domestic violence and sexual abuse are serious crimes against society.
(b) Existing statutes may exclude relevant evidence of the mental, emotional, or physical
impact of abuse in a domestic relationship.
(c) The policy of the state shall be to assure victims of domestic violence the maximum
protection from abuse by fully considering the physical, emotional, or mental effects of
domestic violence upon the victim.
(d) The purpose of this act is that all relevant evidence be admitted that would tend to
establish the presence or absence of physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the percep-
tions or behavior of the victims of such violence, including civil or criminal actions where
self-defense or defense of others is at issue.
SEC. 2. Section 1107 is added to the Evidence Code, to read:
1107. (a) In any action, testimony is admissible regarding the effects of abuse on the
behavior, beliefs, or perceptions of persons in a domestic relationship, including expert
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questions and argument. Under the theory, attorneys argue that the in-
jury or death caused by the defendant was either justified or ameliorated
by (1) a past history of abuse by the injured against the defendant, and
(2) the sociological, psychological, and economic condition of the defend-
ant at the time of the incident.
Media accounts of this paradox are replete with examples. For in-
stance, United Press International reported that an Oklahoma City attor-
ney, D. C. Thomas, won an acquittal for his client who had hired a
hitman to kill her husband. The husband had abused the defendant for
years, sometimes at gunpoint, and had threatened to kill her if she left
him. Thomas was quoted as saying: "Ten years ago such a defense was
never even discussed. In the past five years the defense of homicide cases
involving battered women has totally changed. It's been so dramatic." 139
These cases strain to the limit long-standing definitions of self-defense,
graphically illustrate the very important concept of jury nullification, and
point out the need for controlled judicial sentencing discretion."
testimony and descriptions of the experiences of battered women, unless it is otherwise
inadmissible under this code.
(b) The following definitions shall govern this section.
(1) "Abuse" means intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily
injury, or placing another person in actual apprehension of serious bodily injury to himself,
herself, or another.
(2) "Domestic relationship" means family or household member, parent, or other rela-
tionship as defined in Section 1037.7.
Assembly Bill, 2613, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. 1-2 (1990).
139. Bond, 'No Other Way Out'. The Battered Woman's Syndrome Why Juries Acquit Some
Women Who Kill, (copy on file with author). In two earlier reported cases, two battered wives were
convicted of hiring "hitmen" who subsequently killed their husbands. But, as an additional indica-
tor of change, after serving nine years of a 40-year sentence and six years of a 20-year sentence, each
was commuted to time served by Illinois Governor James Thompson. Thompson said the decedents'
violence did not excuse the murders but did explain their wives' motives and therefore they had been
punished enough. "Debate Stirs on Lenient Treatment of Women Who Turn to Murder." L.A.
Daily Journal, Feb. 7, 1989, II p. 1, cols. 1-2.
140. For example:
Last month, a Long Beach jury decided the 28-year-old mother of three killed her hus-
band in self-defense. The verdict has sparked heated debate.
Domestic violence experts believe the verdict to be the first time in Los Angeles County,
and possibly California, that a woman has been acquitted of murder using a defense based
on the "battered wife syndrome."
The law requires that there be "imminent danger" to justify killing in self-defense. What
made Robin Elson's case unusual is that she shot her husband three times in the back while
he sat in his chair, possibly asleep or passed out from vodka.
The controversial verdict has been hailed by women's rights advocates as long-overdue
recognition of the battered woman's mental state.
Her defenders say Robin Elson was trapped - that she was taught through years of
punching and berating, from window screens nailed shut and doors barricaded with heavy
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Clearly the politics of gender are once again involved-this time in the
controversy over the appropriate role, if any, of the Battered Woman
Syndrome in the criminal justice process. For example, syndicated col-
umnist Ellen Goodman bemoaned the fact that when husbands and boy-
friends kill their wives or girlfriends they reportedly serve only an
average of two to six years in prison, because the victim's precipitation
causes allegedly lenient sentences. Ironically, a female friend of one fe-
male victim is quoted by Goodman as saying: "We have a right to expect
zero tolerance toward domestic violence .... There is no acceptable
excuse. Not alcohol. Not adultery. There's no provocation for
murder." 141
On the research side, a report and an experiment conclude this lengthy
outline leading to the current emphasis on fuller enforcement of the
criminal law regarding domestic violence. In 1979 the Police Executive
Research Forum (PERF) visited seventeen police departments, inter-
viewed fifty police officials, administered 130 patrol officers' question-
naires, and solicited written police procedures and training materials
concerning policing of incidents of adult, intrafamily abuse. A report by
Nancy Loving was published in 1980 as the result.142 As earlier men-
tioned, the text of the report itself recommends upgrading written poli-
cies, procedural guidelines, and training, without any clear explicit
emphasis on mandatory or even fuller arrest. However, a brief executive
summary, and a preface by the PERF President, Bruce Baker, Chief of
Police, Portland, Oregon, arrive at an interestingly different emphasis of
the study. Both cite the occurrence of class action suits, consent decrees,
new legislation and other pressures on spouse abuse policing. They also
furniture, from the two times she tried to escape and the two times her husband found her
- that she could no more leave her house than fly to the moon.
But prosecutors have denounced the verdict.
"Is this a signal that men who get frustrated by the actions of their wives can kill them?
That whenever we get frustrated with someone we are entitled to exact the ultimate sen-
tence - death?" said Denis Petty, head deputy district attorney in Long Beach.
Juries typically have rejected the argument that a woman is in imminent danger if her
abusive mate is at rest, partly because expert testimony about the battered wife syndrome
has been excluded by some judges as irrelevant and restricted by others, the experts say.
Domestic violence experts estimate that less than 1 percent of battered women kill their
husbands. Those who do "don't get off easily," said Nancy Kaser-Boyd, a psychologist
who testified at Elson's trial.
Abused Wife's Acquittal in Killing Sparks Debate, Sacramento Bee, Dec. 28, 1989, at B-5, col. 1.
141. Goodman, The 'She-Deseryed-It' Defense at Work, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 23, 1989,
at 9D, col. 1.
142. N. LOviNG, supra note 73.
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point out that researchers held "extensive discussions with academics,
psychologists, women's rights advocates, and other non-police personnel
involved with the issue of spousal violence." 14 The Executive Summary
then concludes, somehow:
[t]he traditional police response to these calls, emphasizing crisis interven-
tion skills and reconciliation of the parties, is inappropriate and unhelpful
in cases involving serious injury or repeated abuse, nor is it effective in re-
ducing the number of spouse abuse cases. In fact, it may aggravate the
problem by suggesting to assailants that their violent behavior can be
overlooked. 144
Chief Baker's remarks in the Preface are much more pointed.
In cases involving intentional use of force resulting in serious injury, use of
a deadly weapon, and/or violation of a restraining order, the report recom-
mends arrest .... The report's emphasis on arrest in felony cases and in
some misdemeanor assault cases may disturb police administrators who
place a high value on officers' discretion over the disposition of a case ....
In fact, officer discretion is preserved because officers must assess each situ-
ation .... The large number of repeat calls in spousal violence cases sug-
gests that traditional police methods for handling them are ineffective. 145
To his credit, Chief Baker concludes: "Further research is needed to test
the validity of this approach and to determine the impact of police ac-
tions in a variety of spousal conflicts." 146
The research that most influenced the fuller enforcement trend of the
eighties was the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment. 147 The ex-
periment tested three types of responses to misdemeanor-assaults: arrest,
advising and counselling the parties (or negotiating the dispute), and sep-
arating the parties by ordering the assailant to leave.1 41 Police patrol
officers participating in the experiment used one of the three responses,
determined by a random selection process, for each domestic disturbance
case they handled. A research staff worker made a follow-up visit to the
victim, followed by telephone interviews every two weeks for twenty-four
weeks, to see if violence had recurred. 149
143. Id. at xi.
144. Id. at xvi.
145. Id. at Ai.
146. Id. at v.
147. First reported in Sherman & Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic
Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 261 (1984).
148. Sherman & Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, in MINNEAPOLIS PO-
LICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IV 331, 335 (R. Homant & D. Kennedy, eds. 1987).
149. Id. at 337-338.
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Any research project is subject to design, methodological, and evalua-
tive criticism, as well as the problems of monitoring and human error.
This project was certainly no exception.1" However, most commenta-
tors seemed to accept the results, based on both department records and
a victimization survey, that arrest resulted in about half the repeat vio-
lence rate of the other responses.1 51 Those arrested typically were held
overnight in jail and then released. Only three of the 136 arrested re-
ceived a formal judicial sanction.152
Homant and Kennedy acknowledged that "the [Minnesota] experi-
ment is not totally immune to criticism" (citing, for example, that
twenty-eight percent of the cases derived from just three of forty-one of-
ficers involved) but like most, they nonetheless generally accepted the
results. However, they offered a well balanced analysis, introducing a
chapter on the subject by the researchers, Sherman and Berk, in their
book, Police and Law Enforcement:
We are reasonably convinced that in this particular case arrest did produce
a significant deterrent effect. This, we feel, places a strong burden of proof
on any who would support the crisis intervention model to the exclusion of
a law enforcement model for dealing with spouse abuse.
The better approach, however, may be to try to find common ground for
150. See, e.g., Elliott, Criminal Justice Procedures in Family Violence Crimes, in FAMILY VIO-
LENCE, supra note 1, at 453-458.
However, to his credit, at least one of the primary researchers acknowledges a wide range of
possible "limitations" of his research including "Internal Validity" concerns of 1) "Randomization,"
2) "Differential Victim Reporting by Treatment," 3) "Sample Size," 4) "Analysis," 5) "Follow-Up
Period," and 6) "Displacement," as well as "External Validity" issues of 1) "Jail Time," 2) "Media-
tion Quality," 3) "Interaction of Interview and Arrest," 4) "Absence of Theory," 5) "Victim Percep-
tion of Officer," 6) "City Context," and 7) "Alternative Procedures." He admits that this "list of
possible threats to the internal and external validity of the 'arrest-works-best' finding is clearly quite
extensive." However, he concludes that "the Minneapolis experiment actually suffered quite minor
threats to validity" in comparison with most other policy studies and randomized experiments. In
support of his research and the publicity he actively sought for it, he states:
"ITlhe appropriate test is a comparison of the evidentiary strength of the recommendations
derived from the Minneapolis experiment with the strength of the evidence in support of
the pre-experiment status quo." Sherman and Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal
Policy: The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 LAW & Soc'Y R v. 117, 129-
34 (1989).
151. Sherman & Berk, supra note 148, at 342-43.
Repeats Within 6 Months
Arrest Advise Send D Away
Official Records 10% 19% 24%
Victimization Survey 19% 37% 33%
Id.
152. Id. at 344.
Washington University Open Scholarship
146 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the two models. Sherman and Berk found that arrest plus "listening" was
much more effective than simple arrest. They also concede that their "ad-
vise" condition did not make use of any special training programs or refer-
ral resources.
While some increase in the typical level of arrest is certainly called for,
research is needed to try to determine the optimum balance between an
arrest and a crisis intervention response.15 3
Interest in and criticism of the Minnesota experiment has led to re-
search, funded by the National Institute of Justice, in Omaha, Miami,
Atlanta, Charlotte, Milwaukee, and Colorado Springs. Not only do
these replicate the Minnesota experiment, but they expand the kind of
police alternatives used and the length of the follow-up period. Although
the results for most are not available, the Final Report of the Omaha
Domestic Violence Police Experiment casts substantial doubt on what
generalizations can be derived from the Minnesota project:
Given the strength of the experimental design used in Omaha and the
absence of any evidence that the design was manipulated in any significant
way, the inability to replicate findings associated with the Minneapolis Ex-
periment calls into question any generalization of the Minneapolis findings
to other sites. First, arrest in Omaha, by itself, did not appear to deter
subsequent domestic conflict any more than separating or mediating those
in conflict, i.e., arrest and the immediate period of custody associated with
arrest, was not the deterrent to continued domestic conflict that was ex-
pected. If the Omaha findings should be replicated on the other five sites
conducting experiments on this issue, policy based on the presumptory
arrest recommendation coming out of the Minneapolis Experiment should
be reconsidered. Second, while arrest, by itself, did not act as a deterrent to
continued domestic conflict for the misdemeanor domestic assault cases
coming to the attention of the Omaha police, neither did it increase contin-
ued domestic conflict between parties to an arrest for assault.... Arrest,
therefore, did not appear to place victims in greater danger of increased
conflict than did separation or mediation. It would appear that what the
police did in Omaha after responding to cases of misdemeanor domestic
assault (arrest, separate, mediate) neither helped nor hurt victims in terms
of subsequent conflict.
The failure to replicate the Minneapolis findings will undoubtedly cast
some doubt upon the wisdom of a mandatory or even a presumptory arrest
policy for cases of misdemeanor domestic assault. At this point, we are in
153. Id. at 332.
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the awkward position of having conflicting results from two experiments
and no clear, unambiguous direction from the available research on this
issue....
Notwithstanding the unequivocal need to await the findings from each of
the five other replications of the Minneapolis Experiment before consider-
ing the generalizability of findings beyond the sites involved, a discussion of
the policy implications of the Omaha police experiments for the City of
Omaha seems appropriate....
1. Non-Arrest Policy. Since arresting suspects is expensive and con-
fficts/assaults do not appear to increase when arrests are not made, one
response to these data might be a recommendation to effect informal dispo-
sitions (separate or mediate) in cases of misdemeanor domestic assaults in
Omaha. In this manner the costs associated with taking officers out of ser-
vice, transporting suspects, bookings, jail, etc. would be avoided. A signifi-
cant problem with this approach, however, is that it seems ethically
inappropriate, it violates the recommendations of the Attorney General's
Task Force on Family Violence ... and it may be illegal ... to patently
ignore the rights of victims. What can be said to justify a legal system
wherein victims have little protection from violent behavior that is against
the law? That the issue is complex and not given to simplistic solutions is a
given... that domestic assault should be ignored when known to the au-
thorities is not...
2. Non-Mandatory Arrest Policy.... A policy that encourages, but
does not mandate arrest may be useful from several points of view. First, it
would allow officers in Omaha to respond to the wishes of victims who do
not want, for a variety of reasons, suspects arrested.... Second, when an
arrest is seen as an entry point into a coordinated criminal justice system
rather than an end point, it may shift the burden of deterrence from a single
official police intervention (arrest) to a sequence of other interventions, each
of which may have some salutary effect. This view recognizes that suspects
chronically involved in domestic violence m6st frequently do not admit to
having a problem in this regard.., are not easily treated.., and do not
seek help voluntarily... to deal with such problems and thus might require
sustained long term interventions to change their ways. It supports arrest
in domestic assault instances in which probable cause for an arrest is pres-
ent and when victims support the arrest of suspects, not because arrest is a
panacea for deterring domestic violence, but because of the penalties and
the leverage that an arrest implicitly facilitates....
It should be made clear again, that the selection of either, or some varia-
tion, of the above policies is probably dependent upon the ends desired. If
cost is the sole criteria, a policy of mediating or separating couples in con-
flict would not be inconsistent with the findings from the Omaha replica-
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tion. If, however, there is an interest in trying to use the weight of the
criminal justice system in Omaha to impact the incidence of domestic vio-
lence, the adoption of a policy that encourages, but does not mandate arrest
for misdemeanor domestic assaults would also be consistent with the
Omaha findings. It is important to remember that neither of the policies
discussed here are enjoined by the findings for the Omaha experiment....
It is clear, however, that arrest, by itself, was not effective in reducing or
preventing continuing domestic conflict in Omaha, and that a dependence
upon arrest to reduce such conflict is unwarranted, perhaps erroneous and
even counterproductive. 154
Reform of rape laws and procedures has had a parallel history with
this domestic violence chronicle, again primarily due to victims' and wo-
men's rights pressure. And again the popular media has come to their
aid with a deluge of materials. Marital rape, and lately date rape, have
been spotlighted. Since the mid-seventies most states have altered their
laws in this area in some respect. Many states have eliminated or at least
narrowed spousal exemption laws. 15 Thus police, prosecutor, and judi-
cial policies, guidelines, and training have been introduced or reformed
with emphasis on fuller enforcement of the law. Some states have re-
stricted the prejudicial cross-examination of victims and have made other
relevant evidentiary changes.156 While these changes have clearly sensi-
tized the public and the legal process to the plight of the victim, they
have also reduced, if not eliminated, the import of the relationship con-
text on the one hand, and staunch defense views of the meaning of sixth
amendment cross examination rights on the other.
Concern for elderly abuse, reflected in crime specific laws, also resulted
in part from the attention directed at spousal abuse as well as domestic
violence in its totality. 57
154. F. DUNFORD, D. HUIZINGA & D. ELLIOTT, FINAL REPORT: THE OMAHA DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE POLICE EXPERIMENT 61-67. (Submitted to the National Institute of Justice and the City
of Omaha - June 1989). The Milwaukee replication is "expected to show the same results" as the
Omaha Report. Milwaukee, like "about 20% of the nation's medium to large cities, ha[s]
mandatory arrest laws or policies" as a "direct result" of the Minnesota experiment. Mandatory
Arrest Doesn't Deter Domestic Abuse; Study Concludes, Milwaukee J., Sept. 13, 1989 (on file with the
Washington University Law Quarterly).
155. See, eg., Schulman, State-by-State Information on Marital Rape Exemption Laws, in D.
RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982); Frieze & Browne, Violence in Marriage, in FAMILY VIo-
LENcE, supra note 1, at 76.
156. See, eg., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782-83 (West Supp. 1991).
157. See generally Pagelow, The Incidence and Prevalence of Criminal Abuse of Other Family
Members, in FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 263.
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III. THE FUTuRE: FROM LOW VISIBILITY TO HIGH VISIBILITY;
FROM ADJUSTMENT To ARREST; So WHAT?
All of the foregoing clearly shows that for some time now the problem
of domestic violence has been highly visible. Recent studies and argu-
ments suggest the possible intergenerational transmission of domestic vi-
olence to children who witness assaultive behavior in their homes. This
possibility has further heightened concern for the problem.158
The impact upon the criminal justice process has been immense.159
Domestic violence training for police is now commonplace. Arrest is
now mandated in some places, and preferred most everywhere else."6 In
San Francisco, arrests increased by forty-six percent in the early 1980s
and written reports of domestic violence increased by one hundred per-
cent. 61 The Los Angeles Police arrested 5000 alleged spouse batterers in
both 1986 and 1987, as compared with 600 in 1985.162
One of the new Sacramento DA's first administrative actions was to
increase staffing of its vertical prosecution program, thereby placing a
greater emphasis on the crackdown on domestic violence.1 63 In San
Francisco, filed charges increased 136 percent, and the conviction rate in
felony cases increased by 44 percent, in the early 1980s. 1 4 On the beau-
tiful island of Maui, the prosecutor employs a "no-drop" policy. Victims
are subpoenaed. The use of voice video cameras by responding officers as
a subsequent aid in charging, convicting, and sentencing is being consid-
ered. 165 Diversion programs are under attack for having "only" a fifty
percent success rate, allowing the defendant to escape the wrath of the
criminal justice process, and merely being a release valve for the increase
158. See, eg., Kalmuss, The Intergenerational Transmission of Marital Agression, J. OF MAR-
RIAGGE & FAMILY 11 (Feb. 1984).
159. See generally Elliot, supra note 150.
160. See Mandatory Arrest Doesn't Deter Domestic Abuse Study Concludes, supra note 154. For
example, according to Commissioner Anthony Salina, arrest is not only preferred in Connecticut but
aaultors are arrested despite the victim's wishes to the contrary. Comments made at "Mediation
and Domestic Violence" Conference, Chicago, Ill., May 24-25, 1989, sponsored by Association of
Family and Conciliation Courts.
161. E. SOLER, THE SAN FRANcisco FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT: AN OVERVIEW M-3 (avail-
able from San Francisco Family Violence Project, Building One, Suite 200, 1001 Portrero Avenue,
San Francisco, CA 94110).
162. Domestic Violence Program Comes Under Criticism, Sacramento Daily Recorder, July 20,
1988, at 5, col. 1.
163. E. SOLER, supra note 161, at M-5.
164. Id.
165. Remarks by Judge Douglas McNish at Conference, infra note 169.
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in cases.' Chicago and Los Angeles have established new domestic vio-
lence courts-highly touted as a way to reduce case and participant con-
fusion, and to increase efficiency, sensitivity, and expertise.
1 67
Judicial training programs and lengthy benchbooks for dealing with
domestic violence cases are being provided. Batterer's treatment pro-
grams have proliferated from Connecticut to Hawaii and in between.
Mandated by legislation or practice, some programs attempt to explain
domestic violence as a product of cultural sex role expectations and at-
tempt re-education; most employ support group therapy techniques; all,
in various ways, place responsibility on the offender and offer alternatives
to violence through stress or anger control management methods. Mean-
while, protective orders and other civil remedies proliferate and crisis
shelters continue to be available.1
61
The emphasis of all of these changes is on publicizing that domestic
violence is a very serious crime, and that the batterer will be held ac-
countable for his acts by arrest, prosecution, and incarceration, if neces-
sary. The victim's realization of empowerment through access to a
justice process that is sensitive and responsive to her need for protection
has the highest priority. There are no signs of battered women's advo-
cates letting up the pressure to continue in the direction of maximum use
of the criminal judicial process.1 69 Nor are there many signs that legisla-
tors, police officials, prosecutors, judges or even academics are any less
influenced by that pressure. That is the direction we seem to be going in
the nineties. But is this a reasonable, sensible, realistic approach?
To be sure, the 1981 Minnesota experiment seemed to show that
arrest, when used instead of the two non-arrest response alternatives, re-
duced repeat offenses by about fifty percent for a period of six months.
17 0
166. See, eg., Wife Beaters Use Law to Avoid Jail, Critics Say, Sacramento Bee, July 18, 1988, at
AB, col. 1; Domestic Violence Program Comes under Criticism, Sacramento Daily Recorder, July 20,
1988, at 5, col. 1.
167. See, eg., New Protections Help Domestic Violence Victims, Sacramento Daily Recorder,
Nov. 3, 1987, at 5, col. 1.
168. See generally, Saunders & Azar, Treatment Programs for Family Violence, in FAMILY Vio-
LENCE, supra note 1, at 481.
169. In May of 1989, in fact, they picketed a National Forum on Mediation and Domestic Vio-
lence in Chicago, fearing any turning away from full enforcement of the criminal law, although the
focus of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts' Forum was on how to deal with domes-
tic violence in the process of custody mediation. From author's personal observations at "Mediation
and Domestic Violence" Conference, Chicago, IL, May 24-25, 1989, sponsored by Association of
Family and Conciliation Courts.
170. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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And a subsequent BJS analysis of 1978-1982 National Crime Survey vic-
timization data concluded that just calling the police reduced repetition
by as much as sixty-two percent over the subsequent six months. 171 But
here the ultimate conclusion of the most recent reported study from
Omaha bears repeating and may return us to square one: "It is clear,
however, that arrest, by itself, was not effective in reducing or preventing
continuing domestic conflict in Omaha, and that a dependence upon
arrest to reduce such conflict is unwarranted, perhaps erroneous and
even counterproductive."' 17
2
Annette Jolin, comparing pre-1977 Oregon Homicides with post-1977
homicides in an effort to gauge the impact of Oregon's mandatory arrest
law, found a ten percent decrease in domestic homicides, while
nondomestic homicides increased by ten percent. 173 But again, the impli-
cations of this data are unclear and further confused by another more
recent research report on domestic violence which concluded "that there
is no way police can predict that a particular situation is likely to lead to
murder."17 4
Despite all of the chronicled changes, there is really no sign that do-
mestic violence is diminishing! Statistics used by full enforcement advo-
cates in their continual lobbying efforts to show the extent of the problem
may just as well be used to show a lack of overall success in stemming the
tide of domestic violence after a decade of mass publicity and legal
changes. Of course, a decade is perhaps not long enough for any signifi-
171. P. LANGAN & C. INNES, SPECIAL REPORT: PREVENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN (Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice 1986).
172. E. DUNFoRD, D. HUIZINGA & D. ELLIOT, supra note 154, at 67.
173. Jolin, Domestic Violence Legislation: An Impact Assessment, 11 J. POLICE ScI. & ADMIN.
451, 454 (1983).
174. 21 CRIM. J. NEWS No. 4, at 3-4 (Feb. 15, 1990) (summarizing and quoting from CRIME
CONTROL INSTITUTE, PREDICTING DOMESTIC HOMICIDE: PRIOR POLICE CONTACT AND GUN
THREATS). The summary continued:
Researchers at the Washington, D.C.-based Crime Control Institute had hoped to find
patterns that could help police intervene and prevent domestic homicides. But after study-
ing more than 15,000 incidents in Milwaukee over a 22-month period, including 33 domes-
tic homicides, they were unable to identify any such indicator.
The institute specifically rejected the "escalating violence" theory (that a domestic homi-
cide often is the culmination of increasingly frequent and severe attacks upon the victim).
Contrary to what one might expect, in 32 of the 33 domestic homicides in Milwaukee,
there was no police record of previous domestic violence by the suspect against the victim.
Furthermore, in more than 1,000 cases where police were called to protect a particular
victim from a particular offender, often repeatedly, no homicide occurred in the period
studied. "Even prior pointing of guns with death threats fails to predict domestic homi-
cide," the researchers concluded.
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cant reduction to have occurred or any definitive evaluation to be pub-
lished. It is also possible, however, that nothing the legal system does
will alter the rate of domestic violence. 175 Indeed, some battered spouse
advocates acknowledge, at least in private, that what is required is a na-
tionwide reversal of a whole generation of children's sex-role understand-
ing. This may indeed be true; it may also be unrealistic. It is uncertain
whether this could happen soon, if at all.
In fact, the criminal justice process in a free society probably has little
to do with the rates of most crimes. Fluctuations have long seemed to
have more to do with unpredictable, indirect, external societal influences
than any criminal process responses. As difficult as apprehension and
conviction often are, once accomplished, recidivism continues to sky-
rocket, with the period of incapacitation as the only really effective deter-
rent. But with our jails and prisons bulging, should incarceration be a
priority for domestic offenders even though we believe repetition and es-
calation may occur? We continue to hope that one day rehabilitation
programs will work. Yet, their lack of significant success has in part led
to the incarceration explosion.
Also, in 1988, fifteen battered women were murdered in Minnesota,
the model state for the arrest experiment and a state with a comprehen-
sive protective order statute. Referring to one of these victims, Julie Til-
ley, lobbyist for the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women said: "She
did everything right, the system did everything right. The police had
arrested him several times. She had an order for protection several
times, and she had one when she died." 176 In Brentwood, New York, a
protective order, augmented by a burglar alarm and a hand emergency
beeper, failed to protect a homicide victim from her former husband
three days after he was arrested for attempting to murder her and re-
leased on bail.1 77
The BJS National Crime Survey Report of Criminal Victimization in
the United States for 1987, published in June 1989, shows fifty-three per-
175. Or, as Frank Zimring says, in arguing for comparative law research:
Yet the pervasiveness of intimate violence in Western culture suggests that there is a
parochial limit to current discussion of the control of such violence in the United
States.... Family violence, like the poor, may be always with us, but in different propor.
tions and with different outcomes.
Zimring, Toward a Jurisprudence of Family Violence, in FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 547,
567-68.
176. 20 Cim. J. NEWSLETrER No. 8, at 4-5 (Apr. 17, 1989).
177. Id.
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cent of simple assaults and thirty-nine percent of aggravated assaults are
by non-strangers. FBI, Crime in the United States - 1986, reported thirty
percent of female homicide victims were killed by husbands or boy-
friends, with six percent of male homicides similarly attributed. Other
statistics vary, depending upon the source, but the extent of the problem
is rarely minimized. For example, women's rights advocates variously
report that from 1.8 to 4 million American women are subjected to do-
mestic violence each year; violence will occur at sometime in one-fourth
to two-thirds of all marriages; and twenty percent of women seeking
emergency surgical procedures are victims of domestic violence.17
Closer to home than all these statistics are the incidents of domestic vio-
lence reported daily in our own academic communities-highly edu-
cated, upper-middle-class individuals, supposedly the most sensitive to
the goals of sexual equality, knowledgeable of the problem of domestic
violence, and aware of the availability of enlightened law enforcement
agencies. 17
9
While paying lip-service to the complexity of domestic violence inci-
dents, single-issue reform advocates continue to look for a solution.
Many more years of searching for solutions to much less complex crimes
than these have taught that no solutions may exist. Eliminating judicial
discretion in sentencing by mandatory prison legislation18 0 and preven-
tive detention181 have contributed to the prison and jail overcrowding
problem and undoubtedly caused the release or non-incarceration of
others who should be locked up. Similarly, mandatory arrest and prose-
cution or fuller enforcement in domestic violence cases will not only ex-
acerbate the overcrowding problem but will reduce or eliminate law
enforcement efforts directed at other crimes. Perhaps domestic violence
is that important, but crime prioritizing, resource allocation, and sen-
tencing judgments have traditionally been made by police, prosecutors,
and courts with public input, but not by the difficult-to-change mandates
of legislatures subject to the pressures of the moment.
Should domestic violence be taken seriously? Of course. Should arrest
be a serious alternative, exercised more often than in the past? Deft-
178. See, e.g., "Domestic Violence Fact Sheets," National Woman Abuse Prevention Project (c.
1988) 2000 P Street, N.W., Suite 508, Washington, D.C. 20036.
179. Why Domestic Violence Exists, Cal. Aggie, Apr. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 1 (U.C. Davis campus
newspaper).
180. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.06-.07 (West Supp. 1991).
181. See, eg., Untied States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 3142 (1988); CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 12.
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nitely. Should prosecutors charge and go to trial frequently even when
confronted with an uncooperative victim? Yes. Should judges dismiss
less and incarcerate more even though the family may require public
funds for its sustenance? Surely. Accordingly, I continue to stand by
what I wrote in 1978:
Incidents of inter-spousal violence, no matter how minimal, must remain
subject to police intervention. For years a disproportionate number of dis-
turbances, assaults, batteries, uses of deadly weapons, mayhem, and homi-
cides have involved family members. Despite the resources necessary and
the danger inherent in responding to such calls, no entity other than a po-
lice agency has the authority and ability to cope with such volatile situa-
tions. Central to the function of the police and the criminal law is the
protection of life and limb.
The basic question is: what response, if any, should the legal system make
after the dispute has been halted by police intervention? This is a crucial
stage for another reason. It is at this point that an offender and a victim in
a continuing volatile situation have been identified. All of the data showing
the extent of inter-spousal violence and the experience of escalation from
minimal to aggravated injury indicate that it would be irresponsible govern-
mental action to drop the matter at this point. In fact, however, what we
have been doing is to ignore the extremely important preventative, correc-
tive, retributive, incapacitative, and deterrent implications of this early offi-
cial knowledge of subsequent potential violence. At the very least, an
adequate record keeping procedure must be implemented so that all those
responding to subsequent incidents will know of the disputants' prior his-
tory so that an appropriate relevant additional response can be made. But
even more important than our criminal law's traditional escalation of mean-
ingless slaps on the wrist until too late, is recognition of the need for a
breakthrough at the outset to the consciousness of the disputants as to the
seriousness of their behavior and not later than the second time around at
most.
In my judgment, only the coercive, authoritative harshness of the criminal
process can do this. 18 2
But fuller use of the criminal process need not be followed by a loss of
administrative discretion. Rather a change in emphasis and a restructur-
ing of the exercise of that discretion may be what is necessary. Indeed,
anything else would diminish our knowledge of the incredible complexity
inherent in incidents of domestic violence and the need for appropriate
societal responses thereto, first discovered in the ABF data. The police
182. The Relevance of Criminal Law to Interspousal Violence, supra note 33, at 190.
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may not have always dealt with this problem in the most appropriate
ways. But the early research clearly shows that they, better than anyone,
recognized its complexity and frequently tried novel approaches to deal
with it. Undoubtedly, pressures from the women's movement largely
brought about the high visibility of domestic violence. They took up
where the ABF data began and rightly forced the law enforcement and
legal processes to acknowledge the problem better and to be more re-
sponsive to the needs of all victims of violence. Lerman correctly stated
that "the premise of the Model Act is that violence is caused by and is
the responsibility of the perpetrator."' 18 3 But to continue, as she does,
that "violence is not the product of a relationship or the result of the
interaction of the individuals" ' totally overlooks the complexity of do-
mestic violence and thus the necessity of allowing discretion, albeit better
trained and guided, to be exercised by those responding to individual
cases.
The constant possibility of domestic strife is inherent in all adult living
situations. The opportunity and motive for violence are always present
because of the intimate, continuing, and largely private contact between
the parties that necessarily give rise to the frustrations and friction of
daily living. When intoxication is thrown into this setting, as it fre-
quently is, the risk of lashing out increases dramatically.185 In this mi-
lieu, police, prosecutors, judges, and other outsiders must make
decisions. The parties themselves are frequently uncertain as to what
form of intervention they want. Indeed, they may not know what future
relation they want with each other. The intervenors know that whatever
they do, or do not do, will affect the relationship between the parties,
their economic status, and any children involved. But they cannot really
be sure how. Is it always better for the disputants and society for some-
times-violent couples to be apart rather than together? Is it always better
for children and society to be in single-parent homes rather than with a
quarreling, sometimes violent couple? Each incident is different in hun-
dreds of ways. I submit that we simply do not know, and may never
know with any certainty, the answer to these basic questions, much less
how best to respond to the myriad types of incidents arising each day.
For example, in a recent Sacramento case, a 34-year-old woman, after
being in a coma for two-and-a-half months and undergoing eight opera-
183. Lerman, supra note 84, at 67.
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185. See Frieze & Browne, Violence in Marriage, in FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 192-96.
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tions, helped convict her boyfriend who had punched and kicked her,
puncturing her kidney. Though she was glad she testified, she did not
want him to go to prison. "You spend nine years of your life with this
one person," she said. "That person was there when you went into the
hospital to have your kids. That person was there when nobody else was.
You cannot hate this person. It's just like cutting off part of your
arm.' 186 The boyfriend was subsequently sentenced to six years in
prison. His attorney said that the sentence was too long for a man with
no criminal history, who worked steadily, and had been a good father to
all four of the children-two of them his own. The defense attorney said:
"I understand the reasons for the sentence, given the hue and cry about
this kind of offense. But I think the law as it presently stands and is
implemented by the judges because of the public pressure is too rigid." 187
Decisionmaking should, of course, be absolute in rejecting the consid-
eration of some facts. For example, one's race certainly should not be
considered as a reason for not enforcing the law, as the ABF data found
it to have been in the past.' It is ironic, however, that race may indeed
again become an indirect factor-this time under a mandatory arrest pol-
icy, because impoverished victims tend to call the police for assistance
more often than those better able to afford other alternatives. Frank Al-
len's essay, "The Borderland of Criminal Law: Problems of Socializing
Criminal Justice" is again pertinent.189 Allen asserts that: "When penal
treatment is employed to perform the functions of social services, selec-
tion of those eligible for penal treatment proceeds on inadmissible criteria
* * * by reference to their poverty or their helplessness." 190 In such in-
stances, he says, neither effective social services nor equity prevail.
Many other factors, however, appear to be worthy of consideration for
appropriate decisionmaking in these cases. Thus, was the draft set of
guidelines for a proposed settlement of a class action suit against the Los
Angeles police well-founded in telling police that they must make deci-
sions "according to the same standards which govern the decision to re-
port to, remain at, or leave the scene of similar or identical crimes that do
not involve an incident of domestic violence"? They may not even con-
sider such factors as 1) whether the victim and suspect are living to-
186. Sacramento Bee, June 19, 1989, at Al, col. 10.
187. Sacramento Bee, July 26, 1989, at B4.
188. See, eg., Goldstein, supra note 5.
189. Allen, supra note 99, at 7.
190. Id.
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gether; 2) whether society would prefer keeping family units intact; and
3) speculation about reconciliation.191
Certainly violence, whatever the cause, must be taken seriously, and
the offender held accountable in some way, unless the act was legally
justifiable. But victim precipitation is a crucial part of the battered wo-
man syndrome defense to conviction and in amelioration of sentence, yet
its mere use as a factor in decisionmaking when the victim is a woman is
deemed objectionable sexism. Is this reasonable? In other words, are not
all of the facts surrounding the incident under question, particularly
those going to motive, at least relevant to appropriate arrest, charging,
diversion, and sentencing decisions? For most other less complicated of-
fenses they are. Why not in complex domestic violence cases?
Allen and Anthony Platt shed some light on this question. Allen said:
We should not overlook the fact that, in many areas, our basic difficulties
still lie in our ignorance of human behavior in its infinite complexities....
Ignorance, of itself, is disgraceful only so far as it is avoidable. But when, in
our eagerness to find 'better ways' of handling old problems, we rush to
measures affecting human liberty and human personality on the assumption
that we have the knowledge which, in fact, we do not possess, then the
problem of ignorance takes on a more sinister hue.192
The parallel to where we are in dealing with domestic violence and
how we got there is apparent in the theme of Platt's 1969 book, The
Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency. He argued that the juvenile
court had its origin in largely middle-class women reformers who:
viewed themselves as altruists and humanitarians [who nonetheless]
brought attention to--and, in doing so, invented-new categories of...
misbehavior which had been hitherto unappreciated .... Granted the be-
nign motives of the savers, the progress they enthusiastically supported di-
minished... civil liberties and privacy .... Although the savers were
rhetorically concerned with protecting... their remedies seemed to aggra-
vate the problem. 193
My point is a simple one. We have come about as far as we can or
should go toward the full enforcement of laws against domestic violence.
Indeed, we have gone too far with mandatory provisions. Victim advo-
cates have had a tremendous impact by heightening visibility and push-
ing largely positive reforms. But it is time now for them to stop their
191. L. A. Daily J., Aug. 28, 1985, at 1.
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narrow, gender-focused arguments for further changes. More important,
it is time for policymakers to resist pressures from them. It is time for
everyone to regroup and evaluate what more can or should be done.
Most important, it is time to recognize the tremendous complexity of
dealing with crime in general, accentuated in cases of domestic violence
as first pointed out by the ABF data and writers. Such complexity prob-
ably has no solution in a free society, but it can at best be stabilized by
allowing decisionmakers adequate leeway to utilize scarce resources
within the bounds of structured exercises of discretion, considering all
relevant factors.194
194. University of Wisconsin Law Professor Herman Goldstein, long a leading researcher and
scholar on policing, succinctly summed up much of the problem in his Sept. 4, 1989, memo to this
author, as follows:
In Madison [Wisconsin], for example, the police, the prosecutor, and the courts were, on
their own initiative moving toward a rather sophisticated response to spousal abuse cases,
with a commitment to arrest and prosecution, but with some room for discretion and the
use of alternatives. I felt it led to much progress in both effectiveness and fairness. But the
legislative mandate to arrest has swamped the system, eliminating much of the discretion
that was being exercised, with results that, in my personal opinion, threaten the progress
that was made. I understand that the legislature is being asked to amend the statute to
return some discretion to both the police and the prosecutor, and that the amendments are
being endorsed by those who have been most adamant for a blanket form of mandated
arrest. Thus, those concerned about the problem are gradually learning what I believe we
learned in the ABF study; that responding intelligently to a behavioral problem requires,
most importantly, that we recognize its complexity.
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